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This professional paper is an in-depth analysis of a statue of Daniel Webster erected in
Boston, Massachusetts, in 1859. Daniel Webster was a congressman for Massachusetts
who became a controversial figure after he spoke in support of the Fugitive Slave Law as
part of the Compromise of 1850. This paper analyzes the Daniel Webster statue and
argues that the fractured politics of Union politicized public commemoration in the late
antebellum period after the Compromise of 1850. This paper furthermore analyzes one of
the first debates surrounding the public commemoration of a controversial historical actor
with close ties to the perpetuation of American slavery. The Daniel Webster statue was
part of a mass movement to commemorate and celebrate America’s past heroes from the
revolutionary generation and the recent past. The monied aristocracy in Boston viewed
the statue as an emblem of nationalist pride and unity in the months leading up to the war.
Meanwhile, Garrisonian abolitionists contested the politics of commemoration and moral
physical boundaries in antebellum American cities such as Boston. Southern politicians
also debated the significance of the Webster state and engaged in rituals of the public
commemoration.

This professional paper is an important contribution to the historical scholarship on
statues, memorials, and the politicization of memory. Furthermore, it encourages
historians to analyze how memorials fit into the politics of union and democratic
practices of the late antebellum period. Monuments and other forms of public
commemoration are deeply connected to moral about the political economy of slavery.
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“The Union – It must and shall be preserved.” So toasted a group of drunken serenaders
before sunrise on a snowy Christmas morning in 1860. After a night of revelry, this “party of
enthusiastic Union lovers” held an impromptu Union meeting on the grounds of the
Massachusetts State House. Americans held similar and more sober meetings after Lincoln’s
election prompted white southerners to contemplate leaving the Union. This meeting was unique,
however, because it took place at the statue of former Massachusetts senator Daniel Webster.
According to the Boston Herald, the “commanding form of the great Expounder and Defender of
the Constitution” had inspired these citizens’ “patriotic feelings.” With several bumper glasses of
champagne in hand, the men celebrated Webster and his hallowed commitments to Union and
the U.S. Constitution. Subsequent toasts prophesized the “distressing results of secession” that
would befall the North and South should the Union fall. “Webster still lives,” they toasted
believing that the senator had given later generations the wisdom to navigate the crisis. The final
tribute condemned treason and anyone who betrayed the Union. Before they could make another
toast — “United we stand – divided we fall”— the wine had run dry, driving these enthusiastic
Union lovers from the statue perhaps feeling warm from drink and a renewed sense of
patriotism.1
This Daniel Webster statue was conceptualized, built, and fought over during one of the
most turbulent decades in American history which immediately preceded the Civil War.
Bostonian elites hoped to elicit public devotion to the Constitution and national unity when they
erected the Webster statue in 1859. After Webster’s death in 1852, many influential Bostonians
dedicated the statue to his political philosophy of compromise for the maintenance of the

1

“A Grand Union Meeting in Boston,” Boston Herald (Boston, Mass) Dec. 27, 1860.
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Constitution and the Union. It took nearly six years for this statue to come to fruition due to
constant delays, but when it arrived in 1859. The Bostonian monied elite erected the monument
to celebrate American patriotism right when the nation was approaching its breaking point.
Edward Everett, a Massachusetts politician who had supported the statue, emphasized Webster’s
“reverence for the constitution as the covenant of union” and his ability to navigate between
extremes through the constitution.2 Just as with the drunken serenaders, the Boston elite
portrayed Webster as the heroic defender of the Union and Constitution.
Many prominent Bostonians, however, did not share Everett’s enthusiasm for having a
statue dedicated to Webster or the Union located in the epicenter of the abolitionist movement.
Wendell Phillips, William Lloyd Garrison, and other abolitionists had labeled the Constitution a
“compromise with evil.”3 They had not forgiven Webster for his infamous Seventh of March
Speech, when he supported the Fugitive Slave Law as part of the Compromise of 1850. 4 Phillips
called the memorial a “clumsy statue of a mock great man, for hypocrites to kneel down and
worship in a state-house yard.”5 He lamented, “It is only for me to look up at the great slavecatcher idolized and a monument erected for him by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts… it is
enough to show me the character of the Constitution.”6 For some abolitionists the Webster statue
symbolized the pro-slavery Constitution they despised. White northern abolitionists demanded
that the Massachusetts legislature remove the statue for its moral repugnance to the community.
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Inauguration of the Statue of Daniel Webster, September 17, 1859 (Boston, Mass: G. C. Rand and Avery, 1859),
85-86.
3
Wendell Phillips, “Can Abolitionists Vote or Take Office Under the United States Constitution?” in the
Abolitionists: A Collection of Their Writings, ed. Louis Ruchames (New York, NY: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1963). 196
4
For recent biographies of Daniel Webster see Robert V. Remini, Daniel Webster: The Man and His Time (New
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997) and Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, and Calhoun
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987).
5
Wendell Phillips, “The Lesson of the Hour,” in Echoes of Harper’s Ferry ed. James Redpath (Boston, Mass:
Thayer and Eldridge, 1860), 49.
6
“Speech of Wendell Phillips, Esq.,” Liberator (Boston, Mass) Feb. 17, 1860.
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The public commemoration of Webster’s career embodied the political conflict over the threat of
disunion as the country was on the verge of civil war. The statue became a focal point for
different ideological and regional factions to reaffirm their own political values and visions of
the nation.
This essay analyzes the Daniel Webster statue and argues that the fractured politics of
Union politicized public commemoration in the late antebellum period after the Compromise of
1850. The Boston elite’s desire to commemorate Webster became entangled with debates on
political compromise, Union, and the Constitution. Southern politicians also defended the statue
and memorialized Webster because they viewed him as one of the few Northern statesmen who
was willing to enforce the South’s constitutional rights. Garrisonian abolitionists who perceived
the Constitution as a compact with evil interpreted Webster’s statue as commemoration of
slavery itself. Webster’s statue and memorialization elicited discussions from different
economic, regional, and idealistic interest groups on the existing American political order. The
Webster statue controversy occurred in a forceful and divisive decade when memory and public
commemoration became more integral to the politics of nationalism. Boston and other cities
were commemorating American statesmen and revolutionary heroes to support patriotic and
nationalist ideals and bind the country together. Northern Cotton Whigs celebrated Webster as
one such man who supposedly contributed to the rise of national greatness. Southern politicians
offered a similar but alternative commemoration of Webster as a faithful statesman who lawfully
upheld constitutional obligations to the South. Ironically, the attempts to inspire national unity
through public commemoration resulted in sharper political divisions. The Webster statue
became a lightning rod in local and national politics of union and disunion in the 1850s.

iii

The Webster statue also displays Americans’ contestation of public space in the
antebellum period. As American cities rapidly expanded throughout the nineteenth century,
municipal space and social interaction became more intrinsic to everyday political activity and
behavior. Starting in the late antebellum period, statues and memorials in public spaces became
sites of public engagement and political contestation. How a community interacts with a
controversial monument underscores that society’s values regardless of public consensus. 7
Webster’s supporters orchestrated public ceremonies and commemorations on the Massachusetts
State House grounds to support strong nationalist sentiments about the Union. Through the press,
petition campaigns, and protests, Garrisonian abolitionists contested the meaning and placement
of the statue. Southern politicians also reacted to the Webster statue by engaging in their own
rituals and shaping their own landscapes to memorialize the Massachusetts senator. Northern
Cotton Whigs, Northern abolitionists, and Southern politicians all debated the political
implications of commemorating Webster and having his statue and memory engraved into their
physical, social, and political landscapes.
This essay chronologically follows the history of the political debates surrounding Daniel
Webster’s statue and memory. Each section focuses on a different political group and examines
how they engaged politically with the statue in Boston. Part one analyzes the motives of the
Bostonian elite and the statue’s journey to the state house grounds from 1853 to 1859. Part two
explores the abolitionists’ protests and their concerns about the moral and political implications
of having the statue represent their community. Part three investigates how Virginians and
Southerners understood the protests as a sign of disunion and offered alternative

7

Karen Cox, No Common Ground: Confederate Monuments and the Ongoing Fight for Racial Justice (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2021), 4.
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commemorations for Webster on their own regional terms. The conclusion explores how statues
of Webster and the commemoration of other Northern compromisers remains a controversial
issue in American politics today.
By analyzing the controversy surrounding the Daniel Webster statue, this essay
contributes to the scholarship of statues and memory in American history. Most scholars, such as
David Blight and Kirk Savage, have focused their attention on the commemoration of white
supremacy and lost cause mythology in later nineteenth century and beyond when the legacies of
the Civil War and American slavery demanded public debate and resolution. While such
narratives are compelling, their temporal frameworks fail to give significant attention to the
conflicts and politics of memory in the late antebellum period.8 Furthermore, a study on the
commemoration of compromise opens new possibilities for historians to analyze the politics of
memory besides controversial confederate and emancipation memorials. Investigating public
recognitions of Daniel Webster and other Northern “doughface” compromisers is also a
worthwhile endeavor which can enable scholars to determine how Americans outside the South
understood constitutional union and slavery. Additionally, this essay compliments new
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For scholarship on memory and memorialization after the Civil War see David Blight, Race and Reunion: The
Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge, Mass: Belkna Press of Harvard University Press, 2001); Kirk Savage,
Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1997), 5; Michael Kammen, The Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of
Tradition in American Culture (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 50, 71; Note: Historians have struggled to
analyze commemoration and memory during the antebellum period and have instead focused on the postbellum
period. Historians such as David Blight and Kirk Savage have focused on monuments after the Civil War when the
issue of slavery was thrust into the public domain where it was romanticized, suppressed, and integrated into
collective memory. Such scholarship focuses on how lost cause mythology and the desire for national reconciliation
overshadowed racial reconciliation and transformed many statues, especially of confederate soldiers, into symbols of
white supremacy. Scholars have given less attention to statues and memory during the early nineteenth century.
They contend that statues before the Civil War reflect the “cult of leadership” while memorials after the war were
meant to represent the “public will.” This essay respectfully disagrees with this assessment and argues that the
public did debate statues’ representation of the public will, albeit in the closing years of the antebellum period.
Historian Michael Kammen contended that there was a lack of a unified memory of the past during the early
nineteenth century due to republican patience, human indifference to the past, and social pluralism.
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scholarship on historical resistance to controversial public statues. 9 The Daniel Webster statue
sparked one of the first statue controversies where the American public fought over a memorial
of a historical figure with a controversial connection to the history of American slavery. This
essay joins with other scholars that study the politics of memory and commemoration, but it
examines an earlier time period and a different historical subject. Memory played a significant
role in the manners in which political adversaries communicated with one another in the
antebellum period.
Historians have taken a renewed interest in analyzing how runaway slaves and the
Fugitive Slave Law in 1850 intensified animosity between the North and the South. 10 Historian
Andrew Delbanco asked how scholars should judge compromise and political compromisers
who contributed to this development. 11 Here I ask a more targeted question; how did Americans
commemorate compromise with slavery and what were the political implications and
repercussions of such memorialization? This question allows this essay to examine how
commemoration became embedded with into the politics of disunion and compromise. Historian
Elizabeth Varon’s emphasis on the rhetoric of disunion in the antebellum period further offers
insights into how opposing groups may have integrated the statue into their rhetoric on slavery,
the dissolution of compromise, and the growing fears and accusations of disunion. 12
The Webster statue controversy contributes to historians’ understanding of contested
public space and American democracy in the early nineteenth-century. As historian Mary P.

9

See Karen Cox, No Common Ground.
See R.J.M. Blackett, The Captive’s Quest for Freedom: Fugitive Slaves, the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law, and the
Politics of Slavery (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
11
Andrew Delbanco, The War Before the War: Fugitive Slaves and the Struggle for America’s Soul from the
Revolution to the Civil War (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2018), 7-10.
12 See Elizabeth Varon, Disunion! The Coming of the American Civil War, 1789-1859 (Chapel Hill, NC: University
of North Carolina Press, 2008).
10
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Ryan argued, Americans in cities during the antebellum period participated in public ceremonies
and rituals where people came together to perform their civic identities and democratic values.13
With the public commemoration of the Webster statue, multiple factions contested the symbols
of morality, compromise, and slavery that defined their communities and civic identities within
public spaces. Americans who debated the statue contested the moral boundaries of public sphere
and shaped their own democratic values.
This essay relies on a variety of primary resources including petitions, newspapers,
speeches, and broadsides to understand how different interest groups contested the Webster
statue and the politics of union and commemoration. Newspapers such as the Liberator and the
National Anti-Slavery Standard acted as the voices of the abolitionist protest against the statue.
These sources prioritize white bourgeois abolitionists’ perspectives on the statue issue. 14 The
Boston Daily Advertiser was the conservative mouthpiece for Bostonian elites which maintained
a less critical view of Webster and printed information on the Webster Statue Committee.
Newspapers from Virginia such as the Daily Dispatch from Richmond, Virginia, reveal how the
Southern historical actors participated in the statue controversy and the politics of compromise
and Union. Printed sources such as commemorations programs, petitions, broadsides, and
political cartoons provide the means to understand how the debate over Webster’s statue and

13

See Mary P. Ryan, Civic Wars: Democracy and Public Life and the American City During the Nineteenth Century
(Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1998).
14
Manisha Sinha, The Slave’s Clause: A History of Abolition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 1-2.
One limitation with this source base is the lack of black voices and perspectives. Scholars such as Manisha Sinha
have emphasized that historians ought to place slave resistance was at the heart of the abolitionist movement rather
than bourgeois liberalism. Black historical actors including runaways, rebels, writers, and community leaders were
at the epicenter of shaping and defining the movement. The sources in this essay force it to rely on the voices of
white bourgeois abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, and Theodore Parker. While much
voices in the source material comes from these white bourgeois abolitionists, historians must recognize that enslaved
peoples themselves made the Fugitive Slave Law and the Webster statue such contentious issues through their
actions and resistance.
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memory pervaded into public space and political debate. These sources encompass a variety of
perspectives and opinions on the Webster statue and the politics of commemoration from
different perspectives along lines of class, politics, and geography.
Manuscript collections such as the Hiram Powers papers provide this essay with valuable
information on the Webster statue controversy. The papers of Hiram Powers, the sculptor who
made the Webster statue, give valuable insights into the sculptor’s intentions of portraying
Webster as the symbol of the Union. They also explore Powers’s relationship with the Bostonian
elite and his reactions to the abolitionist protests. The abolitionists’ petitions for the removal of
the statue are also available online in Harvard University’s Anti-Slavery Petitions Massachusetts
Database. These collections further provide this essay with distant and unique perspectives on
the Webster statue controversy. 15
With contemporary public debates on controversial statues, this analysis of the Daniel
Webster statue controversy offers historians an opportunity to better understand the divisive
politics of commemoration and the politics of the late antebellum period. This essay asserts that
Americans politicized public commemoration after the Compromise of 1850. Statues and public
commemoration became connected with the turbulent American politics of compromise and
disunion. Although overshadowed by the Civil War, the Webster statue controversy is a unique
episode that emphasizes how statues and memorialization became embroiled with American
politics, democratic practices, the power of compromise, and the rhetoric of disunion.
Creating the Defender of the Constitution

15

It should be noted that there are other valuable manuscript sources that were not available at the time of research
due to the Coronavirus pandemic. One source to consider is the record book for the Webster Memorial Committee in
the Massachusetts Historical Society.
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Daniel Webster remained popular in New England, but his reputation suffered during his
final years after he supported the Fugitive Slave Law in 1850. Webster was not a pro-slavery
politician, but he recognized the utility of compromise to maintain stability in the Union. As a
young congressman in 1820, he condemned participants in the Atlantic slave trade as “pirates
and felons beyond the human depth of human guilt.”16 Even in 1850 Webster acknowledged that
“wherever there is a substantive good to be done” he was ready to “assert the principle of the
exclusion of slavery” in the West. 17 However, his fundamental adherence to the Constitution
convinced him that the North had to fulfill its obligations and return fugitive slaves to the South
“with alacrity.”18 Webster encouraged Northern states with anti-slavery laws and sentiments,
such as Massachusetts, to “conquer her local prejudices.” 19 The Compromise of 1850 succeeded
in adding California as a free state and banning the slave trade in Washington D.C. However,
Northern factions such as Northern Cotton Whigs and Garrisonian abolitionists developed
conflicting interpretations of Webster’s legacy.
The monied men of Boston wanted to honor Webster’s memory and legacy. In 1853, one
year after Webster’ death, one hundred of the wealthiest and most influential men in Boston
formed the Webster Memorial Committee to raise a statue in the Massachusetts state capitol. The
committee comprised of merchants, manufacturers, bankers, ship builders, politicians, lawyers,
academics, newspaper editors, and gentlemen who idolized Webster and benefitted from his
economic policies. The Executive Committee of Three, which led the statue movement,

Daniel Webster, “Plymouth Oration” in The Speeches of Daniel Webster and His Master-Pieces, ed. B. F. Tefft
(Philadelphia, PA: Henry T. Coates & Co., 1854) 106.
17 Daniel Webster, “The Constitution and the Union,” in The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. 5, (Boston, Mass: Little,
Brown & Co. 1869) 353.
18
Daniel Webster, “The Constitution and the Union,” 353-355.
19
Quote taken from George Ticknor Curtis, Life of Daniel Webster, Vol. 2, 5th Edition (New York, NY: D. Appleton
& Co., 1889) 438; Daniel Webster, “The Constitution and the Union,” 354.
16
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represented the different power bases that supported Webster. It consisted of Edward Everett,
former Governor of Massachusetts and Webster’s successor as Secretary of State; William
Amory, the treasurer and director of textile mills in Manchester, New Hampshire; and finally,
George Ticknor, a professor at Harvard University. As represented in this small subcommittee,
Webster had the backing of Boston’s political, economic, and academic elites. 20
The Boston merchant elite, which constituted a sizable portion of the statue committee,
were determined to commemorate Webster for his dedication to the Union and national
commerce. Many of these merchants were indebted to Webster for his economic policies that
enabled them to accumulate wealth. The statue was not the first time they commemorated
Webster. Back in 1850, Webster attended the launch of a packet ship christened the Daniel
Webster in Boston. The owner, Enoch Train, who later became a member of the statue
committee, used his ships to transport southern cotton to Liverpool before returning with
passengers in Boston.21 English businessmen and cotton merchants were likely pleased with the
news of the launch when they read about it in the Liverpool Mercery. Their interest is not a
surprise considering that Liverpool is one of many English port cities built from the profits of
slave trading and slave-made commodities from the Americas. The Daniel Webster would be
another welcome addition to the ships from the United States providing Britain with nearly four
fifths of its cotton imports.22 At the launch of another ship named the Defender in 1855, Everett
spoke of Webster’s reputation as the “Defender of the Constitution” and his belief that commerce

20

A list of all members of the Webster Memorial Committee can be found in Inauguration of the Statue of Daniel
Webster (Boston, Mass: George C. Rand and Avery, 1859), 5-6.
21
John D. Whidden, Ocean Life in the Old Sailing Ship Days (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown, and Co., 1908), 95-96.
Captain Widden’s account from 1850-51 suggests that ships on Enoch Train’s White Diamond Line loaded cotton
on the voyage to Liverpool and then returned with emigrants in steerage. It is likely that the Daniel Webster engaged
in similar practices.
22
Eric Williams, Capitalism & Slavery (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 60-64, 128;
Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf Press, 2014), 121.
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unified the country’s interests. Everett even commented on the wooden figurehead of Webster
fixed to the ship’s bow that commanded the waves just as Webster “commanded the hearts of his
fellow men when living.”23 Even before the statue committee formed, the Boston elite built these
ships to serve as generators of wealth and mobile monuments to Webster’s memory. These
merchants were among the most influential men in New England and commemorated Webster as
the defender of the constitution and American commerce. However, their commemoration could
not hide the association between Webster and his controversial policies on slavery.
Edward Everett and the committee selected sculptor Hiram Powers to build the statue and
depict Webster as the strength of the Union itself. At first glance, Powers may have seemed like
an unusual choice. He was an American artist working abroad in Florence. Furthermore, his
statue, The Greek Slave, in the 1840s already stirred debate in the United States over slavery.
Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that Powers was an ideal choice for the
commission. He already had experience making busts of Webster and he supported the senator’s
work in “defense of the Union and her laws.”24 Powers enthusiastically wrote to Everett detailing
his plans for the statue to have Webster “stand as the defender of the Union” holding onto bound
fasces representing unity and “frowning indignantly” down on any effort to alienate any part of
the Union. Powers was not content making Webster a servant of the Constitution and instead
made him a pillar of the Union itself. “I would so represent him, not indeed supported by the

“Launch of New Liverpool Packet Ship,” Boston Atlas Quoted in Liverpool Mercery (Liverpool, UK) Nov. 5,
1850; “Launch of the Defender,” New York Daily Times (New York, NY) Jul. 31, 1855; The quote is a paraphrase
from the New York Dailey Times.
24
Letter from Hiram Powers to Daniel Webster, June 28, 1851, Hiram Powers Papers, AAA.powehira, Box 10,
Folder 9, Archives of American Art, Smithsonian, Washington D.C., United States.
23
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Union but supporting it, for the country never rewarded his services,” wrote Powers.25 The statue
committee had found the ideal artist to transform Webster into a symbol of national unity.
Everett and the statue committee decided to build a monument for Webster during a
specific political moment which some Americans hoped would mark the beginning of a new era
of memorialization and political stability in the United States. In 1853 the New York Herald
declared the opening of a new “monumental era” and encouraged Americans to fill their parks
and squares with statues to show off the greatness of their commercial cities, match the
monumental splendor of Europe, and “honor the individuals of greatness from the AngloAmerican name and race.”26 Everett had predicted that if the Compromise of 1850 passed, it
would create an “era of good feeling” in the country that would be ideal for memorialization. 27
He informed Powers that if the compromise succeeded, “a political millennium will follow,
auspicious to the fine arts & all other public spirited objects, & of this we must take
advantage.”28 The erection of the Webster statue transpired during a brief political moment when
Americans in the antebellum period looked back to the far and recent past to celebrate national
heroes and inspire nationalist feelings among the public.
There is a popular misconception that America’s monumental era began in the
postbellum era. This has prevented historians from recognizing that the origins of
memorialization lie not in war and emancipation, but in compromise. American citizens were
prepared to dedicate their public spaces to honor the compromisers they believed had heroically
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Letter from Hiram Powers to Edward Everett, July 23, 1853, Hiram Powers Papers, AAA.powehira, Box 4, Folder
3, Archives of American Art, Smithsonian, Washington D.C., United States.
26
“Commencement of Our Monumental Era,” New York Herald (New York, NY) Jan. 24, 1853.
27
Letter from Edward Everett to Hiram Powers, March 4, 1850, Hiram Powers Papers, AAA.powehira, Box 3,
Folder 55, Archives of American Art, Smithsonian, Washington D.C., United States.
28
Letter from Edward Everett to Hiram Powers, April 29, 1850, Hiram Powers Papers, AAA.powehira, Box 3,
Folder 55, Archives of American Art, Smithsonian, Washington D.C., United States.
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given them lasting peace. It was after the Civil War had proved them wrong that the American
public instead dedicated their urban spaces and landscapes to the statesman and the soldier who
encapsulated bravery and sacrifice rather than compromise. By recognizing that the new
monumental era began in the 1850s, it becomes clearer that before Americans were
memorializing compromise and inscribing it into their physical and political environment.

Statue of Henry Clay, at New Orleans, Inaugurated April 12, 1860 29

Commemorative movements took place throughout the country. They most often honored
American statesmen from the revolutionary generation and the recently departed members of the
Great Triumvirate: Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and John C. Calhoun. In April 1860, Richmond
and New Orleans both erected statues of Henry Clay just a few months after Webster’s statue
inauguration in Boston. Although there was no national coordination for such statues, the
speaker in Richmond, Virginian planter and Unionist Johnson B. Barbour, saw the events as
deeply connected and representing a sentiment of unity:

29

J. H. Clark, “The Clay Statue at New Orleans,” Harper’s Weekly (New York, NY) Apr. 28, 1860, 267-278.
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There is a deep significance in the general but unconcerted movement throughout
the country to revive the memories of our departed statesman. The Republic
seems to appeal from the living sons to the dead fathers. Massachusetts rears the
statues of Warren and Franklin, and more recently of Webster; and Virginia is
grouping in monumental harmony and grandeur the sages who declared and the
heroes who defended her rights and her independence.30
These statue inaugurations were also prominent civic events that attracted massive public
participation. The Clay statue inauguration in New Orleans took place in the commercial heart of
the city and attracted approximately 50,000 people. According to one newspaper it was “one of
the greatest public spectacle[s] ever witnessed in this city.” 31 Completing this antebellum
triumvirate of memorials, Powers also built a statue of Calhoun for the citizens of Charleston,
South Carolina, but its fate is unknown. 32 Congress also commissioned colossal equestrian
statues of presidential leaders such as Andrew Jackson and George Washington to adorn the
capitol. After the Compromise of 1850, many Americans around the country looked to
commemoration to construct a shared nationalistic past. They celebrated statesmen and heroes
that were most associated with patriotism, Union, and even compromise. Rather than invite
celebration and unity, however, the Compromise of 1850 and the statue movement in Boston
instigated abolitionist attacks on Webster’s past and the Union with slavery.
From the beginning the statue committee faced strong opposition from Bostonian
abolitionists. When the Webster Statue Committee requested 10,000 dollars from the legislature,
abolitionists discouraged any state funding. William Lloyd Garrison complained that the state

“Inauguration of the Statue of Henry Clay,” Richmond Whig (Richmond, VA) Apr. 13, 1860; It is important to
note that some of these statues were commissioned before the Compromise of 1850, however, they were still seen as
part of a larger movement throughout the country.
31
“The Clay Statue Inauguration,” New Orleans Daily Crescent (New Orleans, LA) Apr. 13, 1860.
32
David Brinkman and Tom Elmore, “’Where is the Truth and Justice?’ A Search for Charleston’s John C. Calhoun
Statue,” HistorySoft. Accessed Apr. 8, 2021. http://historysoft.com/calhoun/calhoun4.pdf; The City of Charleston
commissioned Hiram Powers to build a marble statue of Calhoun in 1844. The statue sank off the coast in 1850 but
was recovered shortly before the Civil War. The statue was never properly inaugurated, and it is highly likely that
General Sherman destroyed it during his march through the South.
30
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should not tax the people to dedicate a statue for a man who had disgraced Massachusetts.
Rather, the “monied men” of Boston should carry the financial burden. 33 Even though Whigs
controlled the state legislature during the early 1850s, they failed multiple times to pass any
public funding for the statue. The Liberator warned of an “earthquake of public indignation”
should the legislature provide any support. 34 The free black community in New Bedford,
Massachusetts, claimed that should the legislature approve the statue, they would petition to
“remove it from the Capitol, & place it either in front of the Court House & surround it with
chains as a memento of the ‘[?] of sins,’ or some other appropriate place.”35 During one vote in
1854, a state representative warned that providing funding for the statue meant publicly
endorsing the “Father of the Fugitive Slave Law.” The Whig majority in the Massachusetts
legislature backed down in the face of such moral suasion.36 Since the beginning, the Webster
Statue Committee faced stiff opposition both inside and outside of the state legislature.
Webster’s memory did not dissipate after his death which sparked heightened conflicts
around the state. Abolitionists blamed Webster for subsequent compromises with the South such
as the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, which opened western territories to slavery based on popular
sovereignty. While the Kansas-Nebraska Act was the work of other compromisers such as Illinois
Democratic senator Stephen A. Douglas, some abolitionists blamed Webster for laying the
foundation for compromise and the expansion of the slave power. According to one abolitionist
newspaper, “A Thousand Douglasses in a thousand years, could not accomplish one tithe of the
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amount Daniel Webster did in two whole years.” It continued, “The recording pen above will hold
Daniel Webster responsible… but for all the escalating consequences that shall result to humanity
the passage of the Nebraska Act.”37 Webster’s memory did not subside after his death. It remained
contentious as the South gained more concessions from the Union.
Three weeks after the state legislature refused to fund the Webster Statue, the trial and
rendition of Anthony Burns to slavery altered the political landscape in Massachusetts. Upon
hearing the news in Florence, Powers confined in Everett his disapproval. He understood
compromise as the lesser of two evils, but detested “The idea of assisting officers of a
Republican Gov’t. in securing and handling back to bondage a slave.” 38 In the four years that
Powers worked on the statue, it is probable that he at least once thought about Webster’s Seventh
of March speech in connection to Burns’s trial. If Powers did have his doubts, he did not convey
them to Everett. Powers was indebted to Webster for helping get his son admitted into West
Point. As an American living abroad, he also admired Webster’s work as a foreign diplomat. 39
Powers’s conflict of interests as a skeptic of slavery, Webster’s supporter, and a commissioned
artist emphasizes the moral ambiguity of slavery and compromise during the antebellum period.
Powers’s reservations against the Fugitive Slave Law and his lack of criticism against Webster
while building his statue raises the important question of whether the public could commemorate
controversial figures and memorialize their positive contributions to society.
After nearly four years of delays, the Webster statue campaign suffered a major blow
when the first statue was lost at sea. The statue sailed from Europe for Boston aboard the
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American ship Oxford on September 4, 1857. Powers eagerly awaited news of the statue’s
reception, however, in December he learned that the Oxford never arrived in Boston and was
missing after 106 days at sea. 40 Caught in a large storm, the crew abandoned ship and were saved
by another American vessel, the Mary and Martha. The Webster statue sank along with a
shipload of marble and formed an underwater memorial somewhere near the Atlantic telegraph
cable. The Boston [German] Pioneer, one of the largest German-language abolitionist
newspapers in New England, reveled in the statue’s disappearance. The paper crafted a imagine
for its readers of the Webster statue at the bottom of the ocean for the sole “admiration of the
sharks below… the slaveholders and slave-hunters of the sea.”41 While the committee insured the
statue and Powers could make duplicates, the loss of the first statue was an ominous sign for
elitist ambitions to memorialize Webster.
A duplicate statue arrived in Boston in January 1859; however, the committee was
troubled with the final product. Expectedly, abolitionists wished that the duplicate had followed
the original to the bottom of the ocean. 42 The Webster Statue Committee, however, was struck by
the negative public criticism. Powers emphasized the importance of first impressions and warned
that “an oversight on their part might not be easily remedied.”43 The committee, however, placed
the statue in the poorly lit Boston Athenaeum which caused the press to label it a failure. One
critic commented, “it is a terrible-looking thing, having the appearance of a coloured gentleman
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who has run away from his disconsolate master, and in stolen clothes.” The British humor
magazine Punch added, “Let Dan’l Webster’s Statue be a caution to sinners.” 44 Everett was able
to contain the damage and convinced the committee that Power’s statue was a faithful
representation of Webster at the height of his power around the time of his reply to Haynes in
1830.45 After reluctantly accepting Everett’s defense, the committee debated the statue’s final
location. They originally planned to set up the statue at the head of State Street, a conspicuous
and honorable spot in Boston, however, the committee no longer felt it warranted such
placement. Everett proposed that the committee work with Republican governor Nathaniel P.
Banks to place the statue on the state house grounds, the public space which served as the
governmental epicenter of Massachusetts. 46
After settling on the State House grounds, the committee finally inaugurated the Webster
statue. They planned to publicly commemorate the statue during the annual celebration of
Boston’s founding on September 17, 1859. The committee placed the statue inauguration at the
geographic and sentimental heart of Boston and built a large wooden platform for 6,000 guests
on the State House grounds.47 Escorted by the Second Massachusetts Battalion, a civic
procession of city officials, judges, military officers, local historical, literary, and charitable
societies, and Harvard students assembled. Honored guests such as Democratic ex-president
Franklin Pierce, along with moderate and conservative Republican congressmen and governors
also attended.48 Such processions and community rituals were important mechanisms of
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ceremonial citizenship in antebellum America. 49 The civic body for the statue ceremony
reflected the conservative, pro-business, and male authority that supported Webster’s policies
and memory.

Daniel Webster Statue Inauguration in Front of Massachusetts State House .50

The committee selected a time and space that merged Webster’s statue and political
ideology with the Boston’s identity. The city agreed to host the ceremony in front of the state
capitol building, a centralizing space for public assembly and a symbol of civic attachment. 51
Holding the inauguration during the 229th ceremony of Boston’s founding also granted the statue
some amount of official sanction and public endorsement. 52 While celebrating Webster as a
national hero, the committee did not miss the opportunity to try and make him the figurehead of
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Boston and Massachusetts. The Liberator accused the committee of selecting a public holiday to
attract a larger crowd than usual and give “at least the semblance of universal homage to the
memory of one who by his shocking recency to the struggling cause of freedom deserves to go
unwept unhonored and unsung.”53 As shown by abolitionists’ fears, the city and statue
committee were occupying a time and space that associated Webster’s memory with popular
government and the community’s civic identity. The only solace abolitionists found was that a
torrential rainstorm forced the procession and attendants to drudge half a mile through the mud
from the state house to the Music Hall under the protection of their soaked umbrellas made from
slave-produced cotton.54
Despite the weather, members of the statue committee and Massachusetts state officials
proceeded to inaugurate the statue and commemorate Webster as the embodiment of the Union
and a faithful servant of the Constitution. Speakers such as Harvard professor Cornelius C.
Felton admired Webster and elevated him alongside George Washington for his contributions to
the Constitution. “One established, the other defended the constitution of the country and their
names shall live inseparable and immortal in the same transcendent eloquence and in the hearts
of their grateful countrymen” boasted Felton. The Republican Mayor Frederick W. Lincoln Jr.
assumed public custody of the statue and shared his expectations that it would renew peoples’
faith “in the stability of the Republic and the perpetuity of our institutions.” Republican
Governor Nathaniel P. Banks also hoped that Webster’s statue would inspire a patriotic love of
country and that the public would dedicate more statues to Massachusetts’s worthiest sons and
daughters.55
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In the main speech of the afternoon, Edward Everett characterized Webster as one of the
greatest statesmen of their time. Everett avoided the latter years of Webster’s life and
emphasized his earlier work as a foreign diplomat, his support for the Greek Revolution, his
oratory and legal skills, and his role in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. Everett
underscored Webster’s devotion to the Constitution and his ability to preserve national unity
while also maintaining balance between extreme opinions.56 “He was faithful to the duties which
he inferred from the Constitution and the Law to which he looked for the government of civil
society” exulted Everett. He warned that anyone who criticized Webster did his memory “a
grievous wrong.”57 Everett expected the community to embrace his memorialization of Webster
as the hero of the Union and reject wrongful criticisms. Everett concluded his speech claiming
that if secession should come, the “monumental form would descend from its pedestal to stand in
the front rank of the peril.”58 Through the statue inauguration, Everett, and the other speakers
idolized Webster as the defender of the Constitution and the strength of the Union. The public
warmly praised Everett’s speech, and the state legislature invited Everett to deliver it again on
the state house grounds later that month. 59 The Webster statue inauguration was a celebration of
a great man whose bronze corporal form would continue to remind legislators and the public of
his patriotic deeds.
The civic performance surrounding the Webster statue embodied elitist hopes of
encouraging patriotism while also supporting obedience to the Union and the Constitution.
During this key decade of commemoration, Hiram Powers and the statue committee wanted to
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present the public with a positive characterization of Webster and his political career that
underscored his political significance as a symbol of constitutional law and national unity. By
raising the statue in front of the State House and celebrating it on a public holiday, Webster’s
supporters sought to embed Webster’s heroic memory into the physical landscape and the public
mind.
Fighting the Moral and Physical Boundaries of Compromise.
The abolitionists in Boston disputed the statue committee’s heroic commemoration of
Webster in the public’s domain. For abolitionists Webster was not a civic model, but an apostate,
traitor, and the Father of the Fugitive Slave Law. Even before Boston inaugurated the statue,
abolitionists were drawing the battlelines for a prolonged struggle over Webster’s memory and
the public commemoration of political compromise. They transformed the Webster statue and
the State House grounds into sites of political contestation. Spectators on their way to the statue
inauguration likely saw broadsides posted throughout Boston calling attention to Webster’s past
advocacy for the Fugitive Slave Law during the Compromise of 1850. They included excerpts
from Webster’s Seventh of March Speech and Everett’s controversial comments on returning
fugitive slaves when he was a congressman in 1826.
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Abolitionist Broadside in protest of the inauguration of Daniel Webster’s statue dated September 17, 1859.
Size 108 x 78 cm. Boston Public Library.60

According to activist Theodore Tilton of Brooklyn, abolitionists posted more placards on the
wooden platform and in the nearby neighborhood during the inauguration to supply information
on the “marvelous omission” in Everett’s speech.” 61 They also circulated petitions to remove the
statue during the inauguration. 62 During the statue protests, abolitionists contested the public
space where these commemorations and identity-making occurred.
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Abolitionists disapproved of Everett’s speech which intentionally omitted any mention of
Webster’s role in the Fugitive Slave Law. Wendell Phillips pointed out that Everett spent three
feet by newspaper measurement talking about the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, “but not a line, or
hardly one [foot], relating to the great treason of the 7th of March 1850.” 63 The speakers at the
inauguration, the abolitionist press pointed out, remained silent on Webster’s compromise with
slavery. “All the orators slid over the final years of Webster’s life and said it was a statue of
Webster in 1820 and not a statue of Webster in 1850,” complained the National Anti-Slavery
Standard.64 Abolitionists brought attention to speakers’ silence on the Fugitive Slave Law and
refused to allow the monied elite to ignore Webster’s controversial past. Furthermore, they
forcefully inserted the issues of slavery and commemoration into public and civic space in the
State House grounds.
Abolitionists did not argue that statues of Webster could not exist, but they did not
believe that such commemorations on the state house grounds and public property was
acceptable. “A statue of a legislative man erected on the grounds of the legislative house is a
statue to his legislative memory” Tilton specified. “It is not as the orator or the lawyer but as the
statesman that Daniel Webster stands in the shadow of the statehouse Dome; and as a statesman
inasmuch as he dishonored the state he has no place before the statehouse steps.”65 Garrisonian
abolitionists agreed that Massachusetts was “dishonored afresh” by the placement of the statue in
front of the State House. 66 Garrison and Tilton did not object to Boston’s aristocratic elite
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placing such statues within the safe confines of their private studies or on their own property.
They contented, however, that the state’s participation gave abolitionists “the right to express an
opinion.”67 They considered the state’s decision to grant a portion of the statehouse grounds for
the erection of the Webster statue an “outrageous abuse of trust and an insult to the moral and
Humane feelings of the people of this Commonwealth.”68 For abolitionists, commemorating
Webster in this space was a “renunciation to all the glory and sacrifices in achievements on
behalf of Liberty in her past history.”69 They even feared that the statue on the State House
grounds would corrupt the public by acclimating them to praising pro-slavery politicians. “The
Shadow of that ugly idol will reach across a great way and fall across of many a man, should
enough be found to put it anywhere on soil belonging to the commonwealth in its sovereign
character” warned the National Anti-Slavery Standard.70 Abolitionist protesters were not simply
concerned that a statue of Webster existed, but that it took on even larger political significance
because of the space that it occupied on public property in front of the state legislature, the
symbol and space of political autonomy.
The Republican legislature’s support for the commemoration of the Webster statue also
shook abolitionists’ faith in the party’s willingness to challenge slavery. The “acceptance
confirmed without objection or remonstrance by a Republican legislature,” the National AntiSlavery Standard explained, “gives significance to this event.” 71 Abolitionists questioned the
ability of the Republican-controlled legislature and governor who approved and participated in
commemorating Webster in the state capitol. The Liberator accused Republican Governor
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Nathaniel Banks of trying to form an alliance with the old Whig leaders to elevate himself to the
presidency.72 For some abolitionists, the Webster statue revealed a moral weakness in the
national Republican Party. “If this section be a specimen of what to expect from the National
Party” the National Anti-Slavery Standard worried “we can draw but very faint hopes of an
improved state of things from their victory.”73 Abolitionists were particularly disappointed in
Republican Ohio congressman Salmon P. Chase for not strongly rejecting his invitation to
ceremony. Theodore Parker and the abolitionist press labeled the possible presidential candidate
a coward when he did not strongly reject his invitation to the inauguration and claimed he would
go far to celebrate Power’s statue and Everett’s speech of Webster. 74 The Liberator encouraged
Massachusetts abolitionists to remove any state representatives who did not pledge to remove the
Webster statue.75 The Webster statue affected abolitionists’ faith in the Republican party on the
state and national levels. With state and national Republicans showing some support for the
statue, Bostonian abolitionists worried if the emerging Republican party was dedicated to the
destruction of slavery or simply filling the shoes of the compromising Whigs who preceded
them.
Unlike the Boston elites who worried over the statue’s appearance, abolitionists
considered the removal of the Webster statue a moral obligation. They did not miss the
opportunity to call the statue a “colossal abortion,” but their criticisms were moral rather than
aesthetic.76 “This act of justice and self-respect will be demanded on no grounds of the artistic
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qualities of the statue” explained the National Anti-Slavery Standard.77 Removing the Webster
statue was an issue of justice and a political statement that abolitionists would not tolerate a
statue dedicated the father of the Fugitive Slave Law in their state capitol.
The Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society started one of the first anti-memorial
movements in the history of the United States. Before Everett’s first speech, abolitionists had
already prepared petitions demanding that the state legislature remove the Webster statue that
dishonored Massachusetts and was “repugnant to the moral sense of the people.”78 This was the
second time in recent memory that Massachusetts abolitionists attempted to remove a symbol of
compromise with the slavery. The anti-Webster statue movement was reminiscent of the petition
campaign to remove Edward G. Loring, the federal commissioner who enforced the Fugitive
Slave Law and forced Anthony Burns back into slavery in Virginia. Abolitionists argued that
Loring had acted “to the deep moral repugnance of the people of this Commonwealth to the
Fugitive Slave Law.”79 While Loring’s defenders argued that abolitionists wanted to “punish the
man who has executed it,” petitioners claimed that Loring’s willingness to enforce the Fugitive
Slave Law violated the “religious convictions of the State” and “the vital question of practical
morality.”80 Loring’s removal in 1858 was a symbolic victory over the slave power and a
reassertion that Boston and Massachusetts was still the capitol of the anti-slavery movement. 81
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After the Anthony Burns trial, abolitionists in Boston sought to remove symbols of compromise
such as Judge Loring and later the Webster statue. As the National Anti-Slavery Standard
enthusiastically expressed, “We got judge Loring turned out… and I imagine it will take much
less time to clear our front yard of this brazen Idol.” 82 Abolitionists were on a crusade to remove
immoral symbols of slavery and Northern compromise in their communities. They contested the
moral and physical boundaries of commemoration and wanted to rid public space and culture of
symbols of compromise.
Abolitionists emphasized the need to confront Webster’s past and bring his memory into
contemporary debate. Abolitionist Theodore Parker saw that it was necessary to revive
Webster’s memory for public examination. “The statute debases the people thus the character of
Daniel Webster must be discussed anew, and the dead not allowed to rest.” 83 Abolitionists sought
to re-invigorate the trauma of Webster’s betrayal from almost a decade ago and instigate new
public discussions about Webster’s memory. The National Anti-Slavery Standard even called for
annual committees and public hearings because “as long as the statue stands the misdeeds of
Daniel Webster will be kept fresh in the minds of men.”84 The abolitionists petitioning for the
removal of the statue did not allow Webster to rest even after his death. They believed it was
necessary to draw Webster into the political conditions of the day and debate his memory as a
community.
Abolitionists also went back to the ancient past to battle the academic elite who supported
Webster. The day of the inauguration, Cornelius C. Felton, like many others of Webster’s
supporters, praised Webster’s oratory skills and compared his skills with the renown Greek
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orator Demosthenes.85 Wendell Phillips enjoyed turning Felton’s ancient analogy on its head to
critique Webster instead. In one speech Phillips claimed that Demosthenes was also a bad
influence on the people of Athens and a coward who “fled from battle and his council though
heroic brought the city to ruin.”86 Phillips even appropriated the words of Webster’s adversary,
Aeschines, who warned of the consequences for honoring an immoral figure: “If you take one
whose life has no high purpose, one who mocks at morals, and Crown him in the theater every
boy who sees it is corrupted.”87 In amusement, the Brooklyn Daily Eagle noticed that “the
abolitionist controversy about the Webster statue in Boston is getting classical.” 88 While
rhetorical and seemingly innocent, Phillips used the educated elite’s own high-brow analogies
and heroic praise for Webster to mock their immoral worship of an icon of compromise and
slavery. He cautioned against creating idols that might morally corrupt the people.
While petitioning against the statue, abolitionists complained of Webster’s past
allegiances to abolitionism’s two greatest enemies. “There were two powers which seemed to
have complete dominion over Mr. Webster in the later part of his life,” The Liberator declared,
“the money power and the slave power.”89 Garrisonian abolitionists understood the statue as a
symbol of the slave power. In 1859 the Cape Cod Anti-Slavery Convention called it “a wicked
homage to the slave power and a fresh stab at human freedom.” 90 According to the Liberator, the
petition movement to remove the statue was “so clearly connected with the abolition of the slave
system and the overthrow of the slave power that we regard it as the special anti-slavery duty of
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the hour in this state.”91 It further claimed that “Every blow that shall fall upon the iron image
will break a fetter in Carolina. It's removal… will be a heavy stroke to the hopes and
machinations of the enemies of impartial freedom North and South.” 92 For abolitionists, the
removal of the Webster statue was not a trivial matter, but part of the larger political struggle for
emancipation and the destruction of American slavery. Abolitionists even distributed political
cartoons of Webster in step with slave catchers to emphasize his compromise with the slave
South. Abolitionists rejected Everett’s heroic commemoration and instead lowered Webster to a
slave catcher.

Political cartoon that abolitionists distributed during the statue protests by Peter Kramer. 93
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Garrisonian abolitionists also argued that the “money power” had long controlled
Webster’s political career. They saw potential signs with Webster’s changing position on the
national tariff. In 1816 Webster was a strong advocate for free trade. However, he gradually
became more supportive of tariffs after attending to his wealthy constituents such as Francis C.
Lowell, Nathan Appleton, Abbot Lawrence, and Amos A. Lawrence. These members of the
Boston Associates, who were involved in the wool and cotton manufacturing business, later
joined the Webster Statue Committee. 94 Merchants from Boston and New York were also known
to give Webster bribes and monetary gifts which made abolitionists question his ability to act
free from bias for the sake of the general good. 95 Rather than see Webster as a self-sacrificing
statesmen for the Constitution and the Union, abolitionists depicted Webster as an immoral
supporter of slavery and a corrupt politician unworthy of public honor or commemoration.
These Cotton Whigs and the Boston Associates benefitted immensely from Webster’s
compromise which allowed them to continue extracting wealth from Southern slave labor. The
Lowell textile mills alone consumed some 15 million pounds of cotton, or 100,000 days-worth of
slave labor every year. 96 It makes sense that the Webster Statue Committee comprised of sugar
and cotton traders who profited from Webster’s compromises and economic policies. 97 As
historian John C. Waugh explained, “Business interests, hating the idea of commerce-disrupting
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disunion, particularly liked it [the Seventh of March speech].” 98 Former slave Thomas
Smallwood wrote in his narrative that the supporters for Fugitive Slave Law “composed mostly
of the great merchants, manufacturers, and aristocrats of the North, who suck their riches from
the South off from the sweat and blood of the African race.” He pointed out, “These are they
who lauded the Idol of Massachusetts, Daniel Webster, the great apostate, for the part he had
taken in that infamous measure.”99 The members of the Webster statue committee included many
of the merchants, manufacturers, and shipbuilders, who had accumulated wealth from Southern
slave labor.100
The statue became a symbol of the Northern manufacturing aristocracy that Webster had
himself helped build. In 1860 Jane Ashby, a 76-year-old English poet, reflected on the monied
aristocracy in a poem she wrote for the Liberator titled “The Webster Statue.” – “America thou
wilt not have an aristocracy of birth / Like Europe but they almost have an aristocracy of worth /
Displace that statue which recalls that dark page on the statute book / Freedom and Justice it
appalls - love bows the head and will not look.”101 As Ashby identified, the statue was a symbol
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of the money power and the growing economic aristocracy of Northern merchants and
manufacturers. The statue did not only remind abolitionists of chattel slavery, but wage slavery
as well.
Webster’s statue in Boston symbolized the convergence of the money power and the
slave power, a combination that abolitionists feared in the later antebellum period. As the Whig
party dissolved, Conservatives and Cotton Whigs considered forming political alliances with
Southern Democrats to preserve one another’s interests. This was the convergence of the
Northern money power and the Southern slave power that Ohio Congressman Thomas Moore
had predicted back in the 1830s; that slavery and banking exploited other peoples’ labor and
endangered republican institutions with their aristocratic character and concentrated power. 102
According to abolitionists, Daniel Webster served two villainous masters. The statue erected in
Boston was also a monument to the political economy of slavery and the mutually beneficial
relationship between Southern slaveholders and the Northern economic aristocracy.
Although abolitionists did not think is such terms in the mid-nineteenth century,
historians can now identify the Webster statue as a memorial of “racial capitalism.” To borrow
the term from historian Cedric J. Robinson, “racial capitalism” is the process explaining how the
modern global capitalist world is dependent on racial slavery, extraction, violence, and
imperialism.103 The rise of Boston’s cohort of capitalists cannot be understood without slavery.
Racial capitalism is what made the Webster statue so offensive as it was the embodiment of a
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political economy that created a northern economic aristocracy that profited from enslaved
people’s labor. For Bostonian abolitionists, this statue of Daniel Webster ordered by the monied
elite whose pockets were lined with the profits of slave-produced sugar and cotton constituted a
memorial to an attack on equality itself. The statue was not only a symbol for abolitionists to
take out their frustrations on the man they believed betrayed them, but it was an attack on a
symbol of the political economy where Bostonian elites and American public accepted slavery,
aristocracy, and exploitation as society’s foundations. One does not have to look to the postConfederate South to locate how prejudiced interest groups engraved slavery’s legacy into stone,
marble, or bronze. Antebellum abolitionists found it in their epicenter of their movement, and
they were determined to remove it.
Abolitionist objections to the Webster statue reveal the conflicts in public
commemoration in the late antebellum period. Not content with the heroic memory that Everett
and the Webster Statue Committee provided, white northern abolitionists contested the types of
subjects deemed suitable for public commemoration in their communities. The growing concerns
and objections over compromise, slavery, and the economic elite further politicized the Webster
statue. Through their words and their efforts, abolitionists in Boston disputed the moral and
physical boundaries of public commemoration. To commemorate a compromiser on public
property was to dishonor the state and its anti-slavery politics. They actively fought over
Webster’s memory and its political meaning for abolitionism in Massachusetts. Abolitionists
protested the statue and demonstrated their convictions against slavery to keep Massachusetts the
epicenter of the anti-slavery movement.
Will They Let Daniel Webster Go South?
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The debate over Daniel Webster’s memory and the politics of compromise was not
limited to the North. When Powers received news back in Florence that abolitionists in Boston
had started a crusade against the statue, he asked, “what would they do with it? Would they let it
go South?”104 If Massachusetts rejected the statue, Powers believed that perhaps the citizens of
New Orleans might accept it because Webster was more popular in the South. 105 Although
Southern delegates did not give Webster any votes during the Whig presidential nomination in
1852, Southern politicians and newspapers honored Webster as an exceptional Northern
statesman who upheld constitutional obligations to the South. After Webster died in 1852, the
Massachusetts legislature received and approved multiple resolutions in Webster’s memory from
Charlestown, South Carolina, much to the disappointment of Garrisonian abolitionists. 106
Southern politicians and newspapers interpreted the abolitionists’ protests against Webster’s
statue as a threat of disunion, and they offered to figuratively and physically memorialize him in
the South.
Southern newspapers such as the Daily Dispatch in Richmond, Virginia, applauded the
decision to erect a statue of Webster in Boston. The Dispatch identified Webster as one of the
few honorable Northern men who upheld the Constitution and was not hostile to the Southern
institution. According to one article, it was “as if he had lived in the Valley of Virginia, that spot
which Washington chose as the last Citadel of Liberty, and which ought therefore to be, as it is,
the great stronghold of loyalty to that Union without which Liberty could not live for a day.” 107
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For his willingness to prioritize the Constitution and compromise with the South rather than
preach the Higher Law, the Virginian press accepted Webster almost as if he were himself a
southerner.
Southern statesmen were, therefore, indignant when they learned that abolitionists in
Boston wanted to remove Webster’s statue. They found the abolitionists’ demands unreasonable
and even threatening to Southern interests and safety. Many Virginians reacted negatively after
hearing Wendell Phillips’s remarks on the statue. During one lecture, Phillips rejected the
idolization of Daniel Webster and ended with a European folk story:
At Reval, one of the Hanse towns they will show you in their Treasury the sword
which 200 years ago beheaded a long list Baron for daring to carry off his fugitive
slave from the shelter of the city's wall. Our great slave hunter is beyond the reach
of man's sword; but if any Noble soul in the state most are our mother
Massachusetts to be had this image we will cherish the name of that true
Massachusetts boy as secretly as they keep the brave old sword at Reval. 108
It is unlikely that Phillips desired his audience to mutilate the Webster statue, although it is not
uncharacteristic of Boston’s violent history with statues.109 Regardless of his intent, Southern
newspapers and state representatives, especially in Virginia, believed that Webster’s statue was
in danger and quickly moved to preserve his memory on their own regional terms. During a
Virginian legislature meeting in December 1859 several representatives proposed naming a new
county after Webster, “the great pacificator of the North whose statue recently erected in Boston
had been threatened with mutilation by fanatics on accounts of the conservatism of the great
original.”110 Virginia dedicated 560 square miles to Webster’s memory. In a celebratory speech
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for the new county, Virginian state senator James G. Paxton remarked that “If the abolition
authorities of Massachusetts consider her soil is desecrated by the statue of Webster, I doubt not
the authorities of Virginia would give it a place in our capitol square.” 111 With the counties of
Clay, Calhoun, and Webster adjacent to one another, Paxton called upon Virginia to “Cherish the
memory of these fine men” who were true to the Constitution and advanced the prosperity of the
Union.112 Regardless of whether or not Paxton was serious about moving the statue to Virginia,
he and other Virginian representatives commemorated Webster as a defender of the Constitution
and the Union. The political debates and contestation over compromise and union not only
politicized the commemoration of public space in the Northern city. They also politicized public
commemoration and space in a different way with the Southern rural landscape.
Southern politicians’ remarks reveal that Webster’s statue became emblematic of the
growing conflict between Northern and Southern sentiments. Paxton said, “It is enough for me to
know that the black Republicans of Massachusetts who are now engaged in a war upon the
constitution and rights of the South are now endeavoring to dishonor the name of Webster.” 113
Even the prominent Southern Whig and staunch Virginian Unionist John Janney seemed
concerned and made similar comments during the 1860 Whig Convention in Richmond. He also
grew frustrated with Northern fanaticism ruining their public institutions and driving out
prominent the men most sympathetic to the South. He argued if it were possible, Virginia should
move the Bunker Hill monument stone by stone to Yorktown and place the Webster statue along
with Virginia’s most prestigious men including Washington, Jefferson, George Mason, and
Henry Clay. He vowed that, “we will cherish and defend both the living and the memorials of the
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dead.”114 Local Virginian politicians such as Paxton and Janney demonstrated how the South
contested over Webster’s memory and practically adopted him as a member of their own
political community. Growing frustrated with abolitionism’s rejection of political compromise,
they argued that Virginia was willing to add Webster to the pantheon of famous Virginian
statesmen.
The politization of the Webster statue is best demonstrated in Congressional debate. In
his address on the deteriorating state of the union in 1861, Senator Thomas L. Clingman of North
Carolina conveyed his annoyance with the growing anti-slavery sentiments in the North and
believed it would lead the South to financial bankruptcy, political degradation, and social ruin.
He finished his address by disapproving of abolitionists’ demands for the removal of the Webster
statue because he was willing to compromise with the South:
How long will it be until it reaches that stage when it will require that the statues
of such slaveholders as Washington and Jackson shall be thrown into the
Potomac, the monument of the former razed to the ground, and the very name of
this city changed the one in harmony with the anti-slavery feeling?115
To Clingman, the Webster statue was an emblem of compromise and faith in constitutional
union. Abolitionist designs to remove it was an open attack on Southern identity. The fact that
Clingman included the statue in his pessimistic state of the Union address reveals that the statue
was integral to the politics of disunion as the North and South were reaching a violent impasse.
The Webster statue took on new political significance after John Brown’s raid in
Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, on October 16, 1859, just a few weeks after the statue’s inauguration.
Virginians looked on with disbelief as Northern abolitionists proclaimed that they would have
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preferred a statue of Brown to Webster. “Who would not rather be John Brown and have his
memory cherished with such tender gratitude by the poor impressed then to have his brazen
statue set up in front of the statehouse labor board for hunting slaves?” wrote Lydia Maria Child
in the Liberator.116 It is no surprise that Henry David Thoreau, one of John Brown’s strongest
defenders, shared similar sentiments. During a lecture after Brown’s execution, Thoreau
remarked, “I would rather see the statue of Captain Brown in the Massachusetts State-House
yard, than that of any other man whom I know.”117 John Brown’s raid placed the icons of
Webster and Brown in opposition to one another. For Southerners the first represented the union
and compromise while the second embodied the threat of violence and disunion. John Brown’s
raid further politicized the Webster and interwove the statue with sectional rhetoric of disunion
between the North and South.
Pro-slavery forces in the South saw abolitionists’ praise for John Brown and hatred for
Webster as a threat of disunion and a confirmation that the North could no longer be trusted.
Virginians feared the prospect of radical abolitionists starting a slave revolt. They were in awe
when they witnessed Northern abolitionists praising and defending Brown’s actions. A public
meeting in Virginia’s Westmoreland County captured the region’s disillusionment. Virginian
lawyer George W. Lewis claimed that it was no longer possible for the South to distinguish
between the abolitionist minority and the larger Northern population since they refused to
penalize its fanatics. “In a little while at least,” Lewis observed, “it is not improbable that we
shall witness the demolition of the statue of Daniel Webster, and the inauguration in its place of a
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statue of Osawatomie Brown! 118 The removal of a statue of Webster in Boston took on larger
political meanings in the politics of disunion. For some southerners, the threat of removal
confirmed the North’s violent hostility and desire to destroy slavery and the bonds that held the
country together.
Northern Whigs and Democrats also criticized abolitionists’ protests. The Democratic
Chicago Times, supported by Stephen A. Douglass, criticized the protests and defended Webster
as a true representative of the Union. 119 The New York Journal of Commerce also labelled
Wendell Phillips as the “Great Villifier” for disputing Webster’s memory. 120 In 1859, a political
cartoon appeared in the Vanity Fair magazine that satirized Phillips and the abolitionists’
protests of the Webster statue. The cartoon replaced Webster’s decapitated head with John
Brown’s comically small cranium, the scroll with a revolver, and the bound fasces with bloody
pikes.121 While Garrisonian abolitionists criticized those who idolized Webster’s statue in
Boston, Webster’s supporters in turn mocked abolitionists who idolized the murderous John
Brown. While the original statue embodied the principles of the Constitution, Union, and order,
the satirized statue embodied chaos, violence, and disunion.
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(Left) drawing of the statue of Daniel Webster in Harper’s Weekly. (Right) political cartoon of
statue of Daniel Webster in the Vanity Fair magazine. It reads, “The Webster Statue After a
Design by Mr. Wendell Phillips.”122

Even though Daniel Webster and John Brown were antithetical in their political
philosophies over the Constitution and slavery, John Brown’s raid and the coming of the Civil
War ironically saved Webster’s statue and ended the memorial crisis. In March 1860, the
Liberator expressed concern that John Brown and Harper’s Ferry had captivated the public
interest and diverted attention away from key local issues.123 At the Annual Massachusetts AntiSlavery Society meeting in February 1860, Wendell Phillips shared his disappointment that
Harper’s Ferry encouraged intellectual discussion rather focusing on the local problems such as
the statue removal petitions.124 The final number of petitions further reflected Phillips’
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disappointment. After launching the petition movement back in September 1859, Garrison
believed that “the number of petitioners would be very large in every town” and that they would
be able to elect a new majority in the state legislature to remove the statue. 125 By March 1860,
however, only 820 memorialists signed the petition with the majority of signatures coming from
Boston and the surrounding towns. 126 The Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society did request
abolitionists to act as agents and support the petitions, however the lack of signatures from the
western part of the state suggests their absence or their poor reception. 127 Ironically, John
Brown’s capture of the public’s imagination disrupted abolitionists influence over public opinion
with regards to local issues. While disappointed with the result, Garrison remained hopeful that
another petition campaign the following year would be more successful. The Civil War,
however, cut these aspirations short.
After the war the Bostonian abolitionists largely forgot about the Webster statue. A
handful of abolitionists such as Maria Lydia Childs continued to associate it with the slave
power. When a slave auction block from Charleston arrived in Boston in 1865, she thought “it
would be a most appropriate pedestal for Daniel Webster statue.” 128 Childs, however, was one of
the last abolitionists to mention the controversial statue as she and others eventually lost
interest.129 When Garrison ended the Liberator in 1865 believing that his work was complete, he
eliminated the voice of the movement against Webster’s statue. Abolitionists forgot about their
criticisms on the statue and their debates on the politics of commemoration, public space,

“Removal of the Statue,” Liberator (Boston, Mass) Oct. 7, 1859.
Harvard University Antislavery Petitions Massachusetts Dataverse (Accessed Apr. 28, 2021)
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:47698989$1i.
127
Letter from Samuel May to Charles Calistus Burleigh, Oct. 22, 1859, Digital Commonwealth,
https://www.digitalcommonwealth.org/search/commonwealth:dv144z696 (Accessed Sept. 9, 2021).
128
“Letter from Mrs. Child,” National Anti-Slavery Standard (New York, NY) Mar. 25, 1865.
129
“Letter from L. Maria Child,” National Anti-Slavery Standard (New York, NY) Jun. 27, 1868.
125
126

xlii

compromise, and disunion. Daniel Webster’s statue has since stood unchallenged and largely
hidden on the Massachusetts State House grounds today.130
Epilogue
The Webster statue was most controversial during the 1850s due to its close association
with the Fugitive Slave Law and the threat of disunion. After Congress repealed the law during
the Civil War, the statue became nothing more than a piece of poor craftsmanship on the State
House yard. The war further depoliticized the statue by eliminating the immediate threat of
disunion. Even though the controversy quickly disappeared, it is important to recognize how
commemoration became closely entwined with American politics during the late antebellum
period. In a moment of political crisis, Americans gave political meaning to memory and public
commemoration unlike any time before. As this essay demonstrated, the statue of Daniel
Webster revealed this politization of space, commemoration, compromise, and the Union.
Historians should recognize that different groups imbued statues and memorials with political
significance that impacted the ways they navigated their physical and political environments
before the Civil War. The concern over an eight-foot bronze statue demonstrates how conflicts of
commemoration and memory merged into larger discussions of political identities and
democratic ideals.
After the brief interruption from the Civil War, America’s monumental era was ready to
resume and flourish. The Civil War may have ended the Webster statue controversy in Boston,
however, the politics of public commemoration and compromise continued into the postbellum

“No Statue for Butler,” Boston Post (Boston, Mass) Mar 25, 1897. There is one recorded mention of the statue in
1897 when state representative Edward B. Callender called Webster a supporter of slavery and that his statue was
placed on the state house grounds to “satisfy the bankers and wealthy, whose idol Webster was.” Besides a short
debate in the legislature, nothing resulted from this outburst and the statue continued to stand undisturbed.
130

xliii

period. Public interest in Webster returned in the 1870s and 1880 after his centennial birthday
celebration and New York erected another statue in Grand Central Park in 1876. 131 When New
York City accepted the new statue in 1876, one speaker celebrated it as a monument for
generations of Americans to “renew their lessons of patriotism and duty which Mr. Webster in
his lifetime taught so wisely and so well.” 132 As shown in this drawing of the statue in Grand
Central Park from the Harper’s Bazar, the Webster statue was a site for adults to teach the next
generation of Webster’s heroism and patriotism.

Drawing of Statue of Daniel Webster Commissioned by Capitalist George W. Burnham in 1876.
From Harper’s Bazar Magazine.133
More statues appeared in Webster’s native New Hampshire and in Washington D.C.
further emphasizing the statesman’s dedication to the Constitution and the Union. Unlike the
antebellum period, however, commemorators attempted to address the Fugitive Slave Law. Some
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supporters used the convenience of hindsight to argue that Webster’s compromise delayed the
coming of Civil War and gave the North desperately needed time to prepare. One of Webster’s
biographers, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, disregarded such claims and argued that Webster
“must be judged according to the circumstances of 1850.134 “We may grant all the patriotism and
all the sincere devotion to the cause of the Constitution which is claimed for him,” he observed
“but nothing can acquit Mr. Webster of error in the methods he chose to adopt for the
maintenance of peace and the preservation of the Union.” 135 During an address at the
inauguration of the Webster statue in Washington D.C. in 1900, Lodge argued that Webster
deserved a statue because he embodied the national sentiment of the people and championed the
national principle of the country, the Constitution. 136 The question again arises, can the American
public commemorate historical actors as patriotic figures while also recognizing that they
collaborated with immoral institutions such as slavery?
Webster was not the only Northern “doughface” politician whose statue and memory
became a topic of political debate in the nineteenth century. Millard Fillmore, the lucky
thirteenth president during the Compromise of 1850, was one such figure. After Filmore’s death
in 1874, advocates in his home city of Buffalo desired to commemorate him by building a statue.
In 1891 The Buffalo Commercial contended that the city had “reached a point of view, beyond
and above the smoke of conflict,” where Buffalonians should commemorate its most
distinguished inhabitants.137 Some readers questioned the proposal and argued such
commemoration could not ignore Fillmore’s past approval of the Fugitive Slave Act. One critic
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wrote that such an act would be an “attempt to ignore the moral distinctions of moral affairs.” 138
The Commercial responded that such moral principles “would decapitate every statue of
Webster, level every memorial tribute erected by a grateful people to Clay, would erase from the
patriotic roll the Fathers of the republic.” 139 Buffalo did not raise a statue of Fillmore until the
twentieth century, but even here questions of morality and compromise with slavery politicized
slavery.
Recently during the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020, more Americans have become
conscious of the statues in their communities and have begun questioning how political
compromisers reflect their communities’ values. Due to Fillmore’s association with the Fugitive
Slave Law, the City of Buffalo and the University of Buffalo have begun reviewing the statues,
buildings, and other public commemorations in his name. The present and historical issues of
commemoration are not limited to symbols of southern confederate monuments or symbols of
white supremacy in the South. While the Webster statue controversy effectively ended in 1865,
the politics of compromise and public commemoration still influences civic identity and
democratic values today. The public is facing a reckoning of public commemoration and it is not
the first time that statues and memorialization have been politicized. Even back in 1859,
Americans were raising many of the same questions the public struggles with today.
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This professional paper analyzes the history of the Virginian oyster industry over the course of
the long nineteenth century. It argues that the Virginia state legislature debated and ultimately
implemented protectionist economic policies aimed to guard the state from Northern
exploitation. To make Virginia more commercially independent, policymakers determined that
the taxation, policing, and strict regulation of state-owned oyster beds would facilitate the
revenue necessary for industrial modernization. This essay adopts the oyster commodity as its
focus to analyze the Southern political economy of the late antebellum period and postbellum
period. This exploration of the oyster commodity reveals how sectionalism impacted the
relationship between Southern agricultural goods and Northern businesses and consumers. This
paper also argues that Virginia’s oyster industry and state regulations relied on the threatened use
of violence. The Virginia oyster police shows that the American regulatory state in the
nineteenth century not only relied on matters of property and law, but also state-sanctioned
violence. This professional paper contributes to scholarship on Virginian and Southern history. It
also engages with scholarship on the Southern political economy in the nineteenth century.
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On March 22, 1864, the U.S. House of Representatives launched an investigation into the
murder of Theodore Reed, a Philadelphian ship captain murdered in Virginia. The investigation
found that Captain Reed was sailing on the schooner Margaret Ann dredging for oysters along
the eastern shore of Virginia when three armed oystermen from the local area boarded and
arrested him and his six crewmates. The Virginians charged the Northerners with violating state
law and catching oysters as non-residents without a license. They boarded the Margaret Ann and
informed Reed that they would take him to be tried before a local magistrate. Shortly after
hearing this, Reed seized a gun from an unsuspecting oysterman and roused his men to take back
the ship by force. The insurrection aboard the Margaret Ann, if it could be called one, ended as
quickly as it began. Before the ship became the scene of a gun fight on the Chesapeake Bay,
Reed suffered a gunshot wound to his arm and surrendered. Reed’s courage failed him and he
submitted to his captors. Under the more alert watch of the Virginian oystermen, Reed and his
crew were brought to the Accomack County jail. Reed’s situation quickly worsened, however, as
his wound became infected, and his health quickly deteriorated. Despite the best efforts of two
local surgeons, Reed died in agony five days later in eastern Virginia before he could make it to
his trial.140
This deadly encounter on the Margaret Ann highlights two core aspects of the Virginia
oyster industry during the nineteenth century. Virginia, highly protective of its oyster beds,
passed legislation to prevent Northern exploitation of Southern resources. Reed’s venture into
Accomack highlights the prosperous interstate oyster trade that connected Virginian oyster beds

“Letter from Colonel James A. Hardie in Answer to A resolution of the House of 22 nd of March last to the
Secretary of War in regard to the murder of Captain Theodore Reed, of Philadelphia, by the citizens of Accomack
county, Virginia,” Executive Documents Printed by Order of the House of Representatives During the First Session
of the Thirty-Eighth Congress, 1863-64’ (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1864).
140
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to Northern consumer markets. Second, Captain Reed’s death reveals that state policing and, at
times, the use of violent force was foundational to the industry. The protection of state oyster
beds and enforcement through means of policing and violence went hand in hand in the
Chesapeake Bay. These core values guided the development of the Virginia oyster industry from
the mid-to-late nineteenth century.
This paper argues that the Virginia state government implemented protective economic
policies with its oyster industry from the mid-to-late nineteenth century. Virginia represents an
example of the activist state implementing laws and regulations that sought to prevent nonresidents and their capital from exploiting Virginia’s oyster resources. Since the 1850s, Virginian
statesmen targeted oysters as a taxable commodity and passed legislation to extract state revenue
from its eastern coast. This plan to raise revenue, however, failed as Virginia’s economy
struggled in the latter half of the nineteenth century. After the Civil War emancipated its
previous sources of wealth in slaves, Virginian policymakers were in desperate need of revenue
to pay for government programs and increasing state debts. They decided to implement
unprecedented and intrusive means of regulating the oyster industry. The legislature developed a
legally problematic system of oyster taxation, created a new state police force that enforced
oyster laws, guarded oyster beds from non-residents, and prohibited foreign capital from
influencing the industry. Virginians sought to protect their eastern mines of wealth located off
their shores and retain its riches within the state for internal development. However, by the end
of the nineteenth century, this vision of state protectionism had failed and gave way to
progressive-era rationalism and scientific cultivation.
Historians have not yet fully examined the smaller units and industries essential to
Virginia’s economy during the antebellum and postbellum periods. As historian Edward Ayers
2

has noted, “Virginia's tobacco factories, textile mills, oyster boats, and coal mines demand and
deserve their own histories.”141 Even seemingly small or inconsequential commodities and
industries in the nineteenth century became imbued with greater political significance and
became entangled in the growing networks of capital as the market economy expanded. While
undervalued by historians, the oyster commodity demonstrates Virginia’s position as a dependent
producer of raw materials for Northern industries and consumption. Oysters also open a window
to view the interstate relations across the Mason-Dixon Line when sectional tensions were
prominent before and after the Civil War. 142
The cultivation and movement of Virginia oysters provides insights into the history of the
Southern political economy. Historian John D. Majewski argues that Southern states such as
Virginia and South Carolina implemented anti-Northern trade policies to achieve regional
economic independence. This existing scholarship, however, is limited to the antebellum period
and does not reference oysters, which were an important component in Virginia’s plan to
modernize and obtain regional prosperity. 143 The history of oysters demonstrates how Virginia
developed protectionist state economic policies to resist Northern exploitation of Southern oyster
beds and labor. Even later in the postbellum period, Virginia taxed the extraction of oysters and
banned Northern capital from influencing the oyster industry. Scholarship on the political
economy after the Civil War argues that the federal government aided Northern capitalists and
corporations during Reconstruction by integrating the natural resources from the South and West
Edward L. Ayers, “Virginia History as Southern History: The Nineteenth Century,” The Virginia Magazine of
History and Biography 104, no. 1 (1996): 129-36.
142
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into Northern-dominated national markets. 144 While I do not dismiss these foundational
arguments, the history of oysters in Virginia reveals that some industries and natural resources,
were exceptions. By viewing Virginian economic history from the point of view of the oyster
beds, historians obtain a new perspective on the Southern political economy as the country was
undergoing radical economic and political transformations.
This essay contributes to the sparse amount of scholarship on the American oyster
industries in the nineteenth century. Part of the problem is scholarly disinterest. As
anthropologist Samuel P. Hanes recently remarked, “Oysters never had their Melville” and thus
disappeared from scholarly and popular attention. 145 The few historians and anthropologists who
research the American oyster industry treat it as a case study for progressive-era reform, riparian
law, scientific cultivation, and conservation. This essay adopts a new framework and views the
American oyster industries through networks of capital and extraction. Additionally, this essay
brings older scholarship on the Virginia oyster industry into dialogue with contemporary
understandings of political economies and state regulation in the nineteenth century. 146
Finally, an evaluation of the Virginia oyster industry provides a testing ground for
historian William Novak’s concept of the regulatory state. Novak contends that the first three

144

For scholarship on the Political Economy of Reconstruction see Noam Maggor, Brahmin Capitalism: Frontiers
of Wealth and Populism in America’s First Gilded Age (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2017); Steven
Hahn, A Nation Without Borders: The United States and Its World in An Age of Civil Wars, 1830-1910 (New York,
NY: Penguin Books, 2016); Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 18771900 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
145
Samuel P. Hanes, The Aquatic Frontier: Oysters and Aquaculture in the Progressive Era (Amherst, Mass:
University of Massachusetts Press, 2020), 1.
146
For scholarship in on the American Oyster Industry see, Ernest Ingersoll, The Oyster Industry (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1881); Samuel P. Hanes, The Aquatic Frontier, Christine Keiner, The Oyster Question:
Scientists, Waterman, and Maryland Chesapeake Bay Since 1880 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009);
Bonnie J. McCay, Oyster Wars and the Public Trust: Property, Law, and Ecology in New Jersey History, 2nd ed.
(Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1998); Samuel P. Hanes, "Governor Henry Wise’s Antebellum Oyster
Quest to Make Virginia Great Again." Southeastern Geographer 58, no. 4 (2018): 365-78; John M. Kochiss,
Oystering from New York to Boston (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1974).

4

quarters of the nineteenth century were dominated by a regulatory state comprised of local and
state officials. To regulate its coastal waters, the Virginia state government passed multiple
oyster laws and unleashed a small army of local state officers with police powers to enforce
them. While Novak argued that the nineteenth-century regulatory state deprived citizens of their
private property for the greater public good, he did not mention that the regulatory state also
could deprive people of their lives. 147 The oyster industry was regulated by laws, but it also
relied on the use of lethal force along the obscure marine border of the Chesapeake. As Captain
Reed’s fatal episode demonstrates, violence was an inherent part of the Virginia oyster industry.
An evaluation of Virginia’s political economy is a case study into the question of enforcement
and state-sanctioned violence.
The lack of scholarship on the oyster industries of the United States is partially due to the
limited source base. The oyster industries in the nineteenth century left a small paper trail as
most of the labor force were uneducated and illiterate oystermen who left no first-hand accounts
of their business activities. Additionally, the oyster trade operated largely on the cash principle
which makes it difficult for historians to recreate the commodity chain from oyster bed to
consumer.148 Government regulations were inconsistent due to ignorant state officials. Richard
H. Edmonds, the founder and editor of the Manufacturer’s Record in Baltimore and voice for
industrialization in the postwar South, once remarked, “There is, perhaps, no subject of such vital
importance to either state [Virginia and Maryland], that is so little understood.” 149 To counter
See William Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
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these limitations, this essay focuses on state regulation of interstate commerce and the movement
of oysters, people, and capital to and from Virginian waters. For simplicity, this essay analyzes
oystermen as a singular collective group, but it should be noted for the sake of future research
that different groups of oystermen including dredgers, tongmen, and shuckers had their own
interests.
This paper overcomes uses a wide array of sources to make up for the lack of official
documentation. Ernest Ingersoll’s report for the U.S. Commission of Fisheries on the oyster
industry in 1881 is still one of the most extensive collections of information on the nineteenthcentury oyster industry. Newspapers and periodicals from Virginia and throughout the American
Northeast often discussed matters of oyster taxation, regulation, and conflict in Virginia that
impacted their local areas. Oyster inspector reports from the county records of the Library of
Virginia also reveal how the regulatory state operated on paper in contrast with its complex
reality. Additional sources such as logbooks and local government documents stitch together a
more complete image of the Virginian oyster trade and industry.
Virginia is an ideal subject for a case study of the American oyster industry. The national
industry was fragmented during the nineteenth century because state governments were the sole
trustees for the oyster beds within their borders. There was not a single industry, but rather
multiple industries that worked largely independent from one another. Ingersoll’s report, The
American Oyster Industry (1881), analyzed the history of each states’ industry separately with
little mention of intersections. Lieutenant De Broca, a French diplomatist who visited the United

the past and present condition of the business. The legislatures of Maryland and Virginia have, at every session for
many years, revised and re-revised the laws upon this subject for their respective states; but have always been
content to work in the dark, knowing nothing practically, and never seeing the value of obtaining full information
upon so important an industry. There is, perhaps, no subject of such vital importance to either state, that is so little
understood.”
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States in the 1860s, also identified this pluralism in his own report, On the Oyster Industries of
the United States.150 Virginia is one of the best industries for a case study because its eastern
border to the Chesapeake Bay contained one of the richest natural supplies of oysters in the
United States and was at the epicenter of the coastal trade that fed oyster industries and
consumers in the northeastern states. It is no surprise then that after Virginia seceded from the
Union in 1861 one Northern newspaper called it the “Mother of Oysters, niggers, and
Presidents.”151 Virginia was also the first state to propose and implement protectionist economic
policies such as oyster tonnage taxation and create a state oyster policing force. Analyzing the
Virginian oyster industry as opposed to the Maryland industry provides historians with another
commodity lens to view the relationships between the North and the South before and after the
Civil War.
The extraction of oysters was not a matter of life and death for most American consumers
due to the product’s low prices and easy accessibility, however, the industry did impact the
livelihoods of Virginian oystermen. Thousands of oystermen, free and enslaved, worked along
the coast to support themselves and their families. Furthermore, Virginia’s oyster beds were
connected to the Northern capital and commerce which impacted consumers and businessmen in
the North. Although it is not the primary goal of this paper, it should also be noted that the
history of the Virginia oyster industry is also a history about human society shaping its
environments to meet the needs of consumers and desires for profits. While the oyster trade may
seem inconsequential to the larger transformations of the nineteenth century, it had significant
socio-economic implications for its participants.
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This paper is structured chronologically and topically to examine how policymakers
shaped the political economy and the oyster industry in Virginia from the late antebellum period
to the end of the nineteenth century. First, this paper lays the foundations and analyzes the
Southern oyster trade which connected Virginian oyster beds and Northern capital and markets
in the antebellum period. Second, it analyzes Virginia’s first attempt at passing the Oyster
Fundum Bill in the 1850s. This section describes when Virginian policymakers first debated
economic policies to protect the state from Northern exploitation and generate a profit from
taxation. This first oyster tax law failed to pass, but it laid the foundations for postwar taxation,
the Virginia oyster tonnage tax, and debates on interstate commerce, which is described in the
third section. Fourth, this analyzes describes the marine border crisis in the Chesapeake, the
effectiveness of the regulatory state, and the lengths Virginia went to protect its oyster beds from
non-resident oystermen. This essay will conclude by analyzing how Virginian law prohibited
Northern capital and corporations from investing in Virginian oyster beds until the turn of the
century. From the twilight of antebellum period to the rise of corporate capitalism in the United
States, Virginian policymakers attempted to pass legislation to protect the natural wealth of its
oyster beds from Northern exploitation.
The Virginian Oyster Trade
The Virginian oyster industry developed in response to market demands of Northern
consumers in growing urban centers. The Virginia oyster fishery did not become a functioning
industry until the middle of the nineteenth century. Initially Virginian oysters were only
accessible to colonial settlers who lived along the Southern coast. During the colonial period and
the early U.S. republic, both colonial and state officials lacked the means to control the supply
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and redistribution of oysters beyond those living in the immediate area.152 It was only during the
antebellum period that Virginia developed an industry based on exporting its oysters to other
states. The Virginia oyster, crassostrea virginica, was native to other regions along the eastern
coast. However, by the end of the early republic, overfishing and overconsumption depleted
oyster beds throughout the Northeast. When their native stocks ran out, Northern businessmen
decided to artificially propagate oysters and financed shipments of Virginia oysters to Northern
oyster beds and markets. In the 1820s the first Northern vessels entered the Chesapeake Bay and
started what became known as the “Virginia Trade,” also known as the “Southern Trade.” The
ships engaged in this trade interacted with local Virginian oystermen to purchase oysters and
transport them to Northern markets. 153 By 1850, Virginia became the epicenter of a coastal trade
that connected its oyster beds to Northern financiers and consumers from Baltimore to as far
North as Maine.
In order for the Virginia trade to flourish, Virginian oystermen demanded that the state
uphold their legal right to harvest the state’s oyster beds. Oystermen depended on the state
government’s enforcement of the public trust doctrine which protected citizens’ rights to the
commons. The public trust doctrine was a largely uncodified policy of riptide ownership that
developed in the early nineteenth century which established that the residents of a state owned
the rights to the water commons and that their representative body acted as their trustee. State
governments did not own anything in the water, but the state managed the common fishing rights
for the enjoyment of its residents.154 The Virginia state government’s interpretation of the public
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trust doctrine, however, became a contentious topic when policymakers later debated the
possibility of taxing oysters for state revenue.
Most oystermen in Virginia lived in poverty and needed the state to uphold the public
trust doctrine so that they could work and survive independently. Most Virginians involved in
the oyster industry during the antebellum period were white men who lived along the coast.
Oystermen were a small group in antebellum Virginia and made up less and one percent of all
male professions in antebellum Virginia. 155 They were often poor, illiterate, and depended on
harvesting oysters for their livelihoods and survival. Petitioners from the citizens of Accomack
and Northampton counties emphasize this point by claiming the oysters were a “chief stock of
support” for the poor.156 Many oystermen lived from hand to mouth and lived notoriously short
lifespans due to the hard labor, risk, and exposure to the elements.157 Oystermen and citizens in
Virginia’s oyster counties held a conviction that the state government had an obligation to
support them. In 1833, petitioners from Lancaster County argued that any state attempt to
prohibit citizens from freely using oysters “was contrary to the Constitution and spirit of our
government.”158 In summary, Virginian oystermen depended on a political and moral economy
during the antebellum period that provided residents with unrestricted access to work the oyster
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beds and sell the fruits of their labor to Northern trading vessels. Living in poverty, often
illiterate, trading with Northern vessels, living in poorly made huts along the coast, paying rent
for land, these oystermen fit the definition of dependency and disempowerment of the
antebellum period.159 Any attempts to restrict the oyster trade or implement protectionist
economic policies could put their livelihoods at risk.160
African American labor was also a significant component of the Virginia oyster industry,
although scholars know very little about their laboring conditions during the antebellum period.
Most debates about Virginian oystermen at the time only concerned poor white men. Enslaved
and free black Virginians, however, also shaped the industry. Virginians in some coastal regions
hired and used slave labor to collect oysters, although the extent of the practice is difficult to
determine since enslavers feared Northern trading vessels were radicalizing enslaved laborers
and aiding runaway fugitives. 161 Formerly enslaved people took on a larger role in Virginia’s
oyster industry after the Civil War, but their labor and influence on Virginia’s antebellum
industry should not be forgotten. Poor white oystermen and enslaved black Virginians worked
alongside each other in the harsh elements and engaged in a flourishing industry.
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Figure 1. Tongmen working on the Virginian oyster beds162

Northern oyster industries depended on extracting oysters from Virginia to supply their
growing cities and consumer markets. The three largest recipients included Baltimore, New York
and New Haven. Baltimore developed a thriving oyster canning industry in the antebellum
period and by 1858 it had over eighteen oyster packing firms worth approximately one million
dollars.163 Many of these companies came from New Haven, Connecticut which also had its own
thriving oyster packing industry. 164 Companies in New Haven such as Rowe & Co. packaged
oysters from Virginia and shipped them to their branches in Canada and the Midwest. 165 This
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system relied on the Virginian oyster trade which connected raw materials to Northern cities. In
1858 the New York Times estimated that the Virginian oyster trade made up approximately 4
million dollars-worth of the 7 million dollars in annual oyster sales in New York.166 Paul Van
Name, Barnet Houseman, Isaac B. Decker and other oyster dealers in antebellum New York
became household names. They took pride in their positions as oyster dealers and retired wealthy
from the trade without ever having travelled to Virginia. 167 They never stood on the deck of a
schooner in the Chesapeake Bay or dirtied their hands harvesting oysters. They left such work to
hired hands and slave labor. Such oyster dealers mobilized their capital to charter vessels, extract
Virginia’s submarine wealth, and make a profit selling oysters to consumers hundred miles
away.
Perhaps no event properly demonstrates the North’s dependence on the Virginia oyster
trade than the “Great Cold Storm” of January 1857. One of the greatest winter storms of the
nineteenth century struck the eastern seaboard in the middle of the oyster shipping season which
typically lasted from November to April. The combination of wind, low temperatures, and heavy
snow froze New York harbor which prevented locals from harvesting the oyster beds in Prince’s
Bays, East River, and Staten Island. Even more devastating, the ice closed the East River Slips
which prevented ships northbound from Virginia from delivering oysters to Catherine Market.
Without a steady supply the price of oysters in New York almost immediately doubled. The
storm created what one New York newspaper called an “Oyster Famine.” Dealers reserved their
supplies and temporarily denied the city dwellers their beloved oyster fries and stews. 168 They
were only spared when shiploads of Virginia oysters landed in New Jersey and were transported
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by land. While New Yorkers were more likely to die of the cold than an oyster famine, the
“Great Cold Storm,” reveals that consumers and businessmen in Northern cities such as New
York depended on Virginia for a steady supply of oysters. The Southern oyster trade created
artificial markets that depended on the transportation of natural resources hundreds of miles from
their original location. If legal or economic barriers were to impede this trade, Northern markets
would surely feel its impact. 169

Figure 2. Virginian oystermen selling oysters to a Northern carrying ship170
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Oysters were one of Virginia’s most important exports during the winter and spring
months. From April to June in 1860, oysters exceeded all other Virginian exports to the North in
both amount and value.171 There was a significant amount of capital invested in the shipment of
Virginia oysters. According to the oyster dealers of New York City, approximately two hundred
sailing vessels engaged in the oyster trade valuing at approximately one million dollars. 172 The
majority of vessels were fishing schooners that sold their services to supply oyster dealers in
Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, New Haven, and Boston. Northern-built ships spent multiple
weeks in Virginia’s tributary rivers before returning with thousands of bushels of oysters to
Northern markets.173 Although it was less common than chartering, some of the Northern
entrepreneurs engaged in the oyster trade owned their own vessels. Some investors from New
Haven, for example, used their capital to purchase captured slave ships from the Chesapeake and
added them to their oyster fleets. 174 While few oyster firms such as Rowe & Co. of New Haven
could afford to own their own freight ships, most of the vessels engaged in the oyster trade
worked independently with profits divided between the captain, workers, and the ship’s board of
partners.175 Schooners were involved in deep sea fishing and the West Indies fruit trade for most
of the year and then contracted by oyster dealers and firms in the winter. 176
The infrastructure of the Virginia oyster trade bridged local communities along the upper
Atlantic coast. The trade thrived in the closing years of the antebellum period because the ships
and capital finally made this interstate commerce more manageable and profitable. Southern
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oyster beds became entangled in larger economic networks that connected poor Virginian
oystermen with Northern oyster dealers, ship owners, sailors, and consumers. During the final
years of the antebellum period, however, Virginian state politicians feared that the North was
benefiting from these networks at Virginia’s expense. In response, they strained these
connections and debated erecting a protectionist economic policy that concerned all the parties
involved.
Governor Wise Proclaiming the Oyster Fundum
Virginian policymakers started to worry at the close of the antebellum period that the
state’s oyster resources and poor white oystermen were becoming subservient to Northern
market interests. They politicized Virginia’s oyster industry as sectional tensions intensified and
Southerners argued for greater economic independence from the North. In 1856, Henry A. Wise,
the last Virginian governor from the eastern shore until the twenty-first century, started
formulating plans to protect and promote the oyster industry. Wise started a discussion that
would continue well into end of the nineteenth century and compel Virginian policymakers to
reconceptualize the methods state governments should take to protect its trade and resources.
Wise was a modernist who desired to build up Virginia’s commercial power by investing in
railroads, canals, and other internal improvement projects. Virginia’s dependence on shifting
agricultural production and its small free population impeded its urban growth. Wise hoped for a
commercial revolution that would free Virginians from economic subservience to the North
while maintaining its vibrant slave economy. 177 In 1856, Wise wrote a message to the Virginia
legislature stressing the need to continue funding its projects as the Covington and Ohio Railroad

177

John Majewski, Modernizing the Slave Economy, 81, 94-95.

16

and the James River and Kanawha Company. 178 By 1860, Virginia had taken on 33,243,141
dollars of debt to fund its internal improvement projects, making it one of the largest borrowing
states during the antebellum period. 179 To continue with these costly projects, Wise argued that
the state government had to find new sources of taxable revenue. Coming from the Tidewater
region himself, Wise proposed a tax on the oyster trade to fund Virginia’s modernization.
Wise surmised that a tax on Virginia’s oysters was the best solution to the growing state
debt. In his message to the legisalture, he complained that past attempts to pay the debt by
issuing bonds or “hocus pocus” legislation failed and hurt taxpayers.180 “[I]f a state owed a
debt,” Wise argued, “it must exert the sovereign remedy of taxation.”181 To succeed where past
statesmen had failed, Wise recommended that the legislature to take note of its oyster beds,
which he called Virginia’s “vast and inexhaustible sources of revenue untouched and
unnoticed.”182 The governor anticipated that oyster taxes would generate a major source of state
revenue. In his messages to the General Assembly in 1856, Wise described the oyster beds as an
“eastern mine of wealth.”183 Further developing his comparison between oysters with mineral
resources, Wise claimed that working in the Virginia oyster trade was “more productive than
working in the gold mines of California.”184
The oyster banks will pay a better bonus than the banks of paper currency. An
oyster mine is a richer source of profit to labor than any known mine of coal,
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copper, silver, or gold. If our oyster beds had been mines of metals, they would
not have been so neglected by legislation as a source of revenue. 185
According to the Wise’s optimistic estimations, an oyster tax would yield a revenue of nearly
half a million dollars per year. 186 Wise had convinced himself that Virginia’s abundance of
oysters constituted a taxable mineral resource that could remedy the state’s infrastructural and
economic dilemma. The Virginian governor repeatedly shared his enthusiasm wherever he could
in public and business life. During a dinner speech for the Central Railroad excursionists in
1856, Wise shouted out statistics about the wealth of the oyster beds and remarked how Northern
Yankees were profiting from the “Virginia Golden Goose.”187 The following year Wise was
trying to convince the representatives of the Franco-American Transatlantic Navigation
Company trying to open a direct line of trade between France and Virginia. In his
correspondence Wise boasted of Virginia’s commercial potential and natural wealth which
included its oyster beds.188 Wise placed oysters at the heart of his policy to modernize Virginia
and break free from economic subservience to dominant Northern markets.
The Virginian governor tactfully reinterpreted the public trust doctrine to legitimize the
state government’s right to tax its oysters. Wise’s use of the term “oyster fundum” established
the legal foundation to justify taxation. 189 The Alexandria Gazette explained, “The Oyster
Fundum means Oyster Bottom, not the lower half of the fish, but the ground or ‘bottom’ whence
it is raised.”190 Wise’s use of the term fundum therefore connected the oyster beds to the
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underwater soil which was legally state property under the public trust doctrine.191 This
understanding of the public trust doctrine justified the state government’s right to tax oysters as
state property.192 The prior understanding of the public trust doctrine for the oyster industry gave
the state the right to maintain the oyster commons for the people, not to tax it for the ake of
generating revenue. Departing from past government precedents, Wise provided Virginia with a
new prerogative to tax oysters and fund its modernization.
Legislators in the Virginia House of Delegates started debating Wise’s proposal in 1858
and formed a special commission to investigate the feasibility of generating a revenue through
taxing the oyster trade. Representative James G. Paxton led the commission even though, like
many of his colleagues, he knew little about the industry. The committee summoned individuals
engaged in the Virginian oyster industry to gather information before proposing the final tax bill.
After several days inside the Senate clerk’s office, the Exchange Hotel, and the Ballard House in
Richmond, the seventeen-man committee questioned Virginians about their knowledge of the
industry. Some traveled over two hundred miles from the eastern shore to give their testimony.
In the process they revealed the lack of understanding between the oyster districts and the
legislature in the state capitol that represented them.193
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Ship charterers, captains, sailors, oyster planters and coastal residents answered the
state’s summons, but few shared Wise’s optimistic view of the gold mines off its eastern coast.
They expounded on a variety of topics such as the quality of oysters, small-scale planting,
domestic shipping, slave labor and poor white oystermen. Yet, they spoke of the lack of large
profits in the industry. Despite all their knowledge and experience, they could only offer rough
estimations to answer the committee’s questions. A large majority of the testifiers believed that
Governor Wise’s proposed Oyster Fundum Bill would ruin the shipping trade and force them to
leave the industry. The tax, they feared would drive Northern oyster vessels to purchase oysters
elsewhere and lower oystermens’ prices. One testifier from Princess Anne’s County replied, “It
does not fully appear to my mind that if the Legislature will impose a tax on oysters, that the
consumers at the North will ultimately foot the bill.” 194 Many of those engaged in the industry
voiced their concerns about the devastating impact the Oyster Fundum Bill would have on
themselves and poor oystermen. Another respondent remarked that a tax on the trade would
drive the already oystermen into the poorhouse. 195 Any legislative attempt to tax the oyster
industry, testifiers claimed, would end in disaster.
After spending weeks and several long nights examining and cross-examining littoral
Virginians during the late winter of 1858, the select oyster committee became divided over how
to proceed with the Oyster Fundum Tax Bill. The chairman, Senator James G. Paxton of
Rockbridge County was confident that Virginia could prosper from an oyster tax. He submitted
the Oyster Fundum Bill to the House of Delegates before the end of the year. The bill proposed a
tax on Northern vessels taking oysters from Virginian waters and called for the state to fund the
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creation of a small force of steamships to enforce the oyster laws of the state. 196 Paxton and his
supporters argued that both Virginia and her oystermen needed state protection from Northern
exploitation. William G. Lamb, the editor for the Norfolk Argus and an aid to Paxton’s
committee, claimed that Northern ships carried eighteen million bushels of oysters out of
Virginia each year, and that Virginia only received one-fifth of the trade’s profits.197 Northern
cities, such as Fair Haven, Connecticut, Lamb argued, enriched themselves at Virginia’s
expense. The Southern journalist and fire-eater J.D.B. De Bow reprinted Lamb’s accusatory
article in the De Bow’s Review; “[I]ts streets are paved with Virginia oyster shells, and its
people’s pockets are filled with the profits on their contents.” 198 Oyster planters in Northern
areas such as New Haven purchased Virginian seed oysters and “planted” them over organized
plots. After a few years the oysters grew to a marketable size and planters sold them for a higher
profit.199 Paxton and his supporters were convinced that they had to stop Northern markets from
exploiting Virginia’s oysters and “making the most of the poor white man's labor.”200 For the
Oyster Fundum Bill’s supporters a tax would flip the script by protecting Virginian oystermen
from profit-seeking Northerners and making consumers bare the costs.
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Opposing Paxton was Joseph Christian, the new Whig senator from the coastal Mathews
County. Also a member of the select oyster committee, Christian heard the warnings from the
testifiers and suspected a tax would devastate his constituents and the state’s oyster industry.
While Wise and Paxton saw the Oyster Fundum Bill as a necessity for Virginia’s economic
independence, Christian understood it to be a dangerous threat to the industry. In 1860, Christian
claimed that the Oyster Fundum Bill was not in the best interest of Virginian oystermen and
warned that a tax on the oyster trade would fall on the producer rather than the consumer since
Northern vessels would likely refuse to pay oystermen higher prices. Concerned with the
opposition and vague estimations from committee investigation, Christian reasoned that a tax on
the carrying trade would encourage Northern ships to purchase oysters elsewhere which would
destroy the fragile industry. In the process such a tax, Christian argued, would reduce poor
oystermen to a state of pauperism by denying them their means of food and employment. He
prophesized that “Every dollar they earn they obtain by selling oysters to these vessels, which
this bill will drive from our waters.” Driven by the committee’s evidence and his own
experience living in eastern Virginia, Christian saw the self-inflicted harm in taxing the oyster
industry. The oystermen themselves also feared that excessive state involvement threatened
resident’s rights to the commons. In the only petition to protest the Oyster Fundum Bill, the
oystermen of Gloucester County voiced their concerns about the privatization of oyster beds
which would destroy the livelihoods of poor oystermen and enable the more competitive and
affluent members of society to monopolize the coastline. 201 Christian suggested that the state
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government uphold the public trust doctrine and conserve the oyster beds for the public’s use
rather than privatize it and drive the carrying trade from its shores.
Christian positioned himself as the rationalist and the oystermens’ defender, but he was
by no extent a Northern sympathizer. In fact, he fully supported making Virginia commercially,
and if need be politically, independent. The Oyster Fundum Tax question took on a larger
political significance as it became entangled with the sectional crisis of the late 1850s. Christian
delivered his speech less than four months after John Brown’s raid on the federal arsenal in
Harpers Ferry, Virginia, which spread radicalism throughout Virginia and the deep South. In his
criticism of the oyster tax bill, Paxton emphasized the military necessity for Virginia to protect
its loyal oystermen from oppressive taxation and regulation in case civil war should break out.
Paxton claimed, “If the day shall ever come when the sons of Virginia shall be called upon to
protect and defend her honor and her sovereignty, no men will be found rushing into the conflict
with more alacrity and truer courage to repel the invaders from her soil, then these same poor and
humble oystermen.”202Appealing to the radical and military fervor of the late antebellum period,
Paxton argued that taxing the oyster industry would only impoverish the poor and loyal white
oystermen willing to defend the South as the sectional crisis reached its breaking point.
Representatives from the eastern counties in the state legislature strongly rejected
Paxton’s bill. The politics surrounding the debates on the Oyster Fundum Bill were tied up in
Virginia’s geographic divide rather than partisan issues. The western part of Virginia which
needed infrastructure conflicted with the eastern part which possessed most of the state’s
representation, slaves, wealth, and had less need for government spending on such projects. 203
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West Virginians gradually became more skeptical of the state government’s ability to manage
such projects and came to resent the increasing debt and how railroads extended aimlessly
throughout the west. The Oyster Fundum Bill faced stiff opposition from all parts of the state.
Proponents of the tax, therefore, resorted to framing the tax a measure to protect poor Virginians
from Northern exploitation.204
Northern interests unsurprisingly disapproved of the Oyster Fundum Bill and saw it as an
affront to free enterprise. The Northern press criticized the bill as an affront to “laissez-faire”
trade between the states.205 The Evening Post warned that should Virginia pass the Oyster
Fundum Bill every oyster-cellar, kitchen, and dining room in the region would label Wise a
public enemy. The Post further criticized Wise for “his old doctrines of restraint upon trade and
the intermeddling of government with the occupation of individuals.” 206 Consumers in New
York, who were most dependent on Virginian oysters, deplored Wise’s proposal as an improper
obstacle on interstate trade. When the Oyster Fundum Bill failed to pass in the Virginia House of
Delegates during the 1858 session, the New York Times celebrated:
Virginia’s oysters are to be, as heretofore, an untaxed luxury. The doctrine of
laissez faire is to be applied in its widest sense to the submarine wealth on the
shores of the Old Dominion, and the oystermen of Staten Island will be permitted
to follow their old trade without let or hindrance. 207
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To Northern consumers, the Virginia oyster tax threatened to disrupt existing lines of capital and
interstate commerce that has enabled New York oyster dealers to extract Virginia’s natural
wealth.
When the Virginia legislature attempted to pass the Oyster Fundum Bill again in 1860 it
failed, and its opponents were elated. The celebrations, however, did not last long. Christian’s
speech in the Senate in 1860 effectively killed the Oyster Fundum Bill and any remaining chance
of Virginia implementing protective economic policies for its oyster industry in the antebellum
era. After years of debate, the legislature unceremoniously tabled the bill into oblivion without a
recorded vote. The issues of state protectionism and oyster taxation, however, continued after the
Civil War. The years from 1856 to 1860 was a crucial period in the development of Virginia’s
oyster policies because it was the first time that Virginian policymakers considered taxing
interstate commerce and its submarine wealth.
Virginia’s decision to secede from the Union at the start of the Civil War in 1861 halted
the oyster trade and closed off the nation’s access to the beloved bivalve. The trade’s disruption
did not go unnoticed in the North’s oyster-eating cities. Early into the war New York’s Journal
of Commerce lamented that “the cutting off of the Chesapeake oyster trade [was] one of the
incidental curses inflicted upon the North by secession.”208 Not all despaired, however. After the
last schooners sailed North with their cargoes of oysters, the U.S. Navy moved South and
blockaded the coast. Union naval commanders such as Lieutenant Edward Hooker patrolled the
Virginian coast for rebel activity. When Hooker was not evading mines, bombarding the coast,
or monitoring shipping activity aboard his heavily armed New York ferry gunship the USS
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Commodore Reed, he and his men helped themselves to dredging Virginia’s oysters and sending
barrels full to other U.S. officers. 209 From 1861 to 1865 the Civil War made oysters into a highly
desired and sought-after commodity for Northern consumers. After the war’s end, however, the
oyster question once again resurfaced into Reconstruction politics. Returning Virginian
statesmen hoped to harness and regulate the North’s desire for oysters for their own economic
benefit to rebuild the state which was in dire economic circumstances.
The Virginia Oyster Tonnage Tax
The Civil War was the catalyst that revived the oyster question in postbellum Virginian
politics. The federal blockade halted the Virginia trade for nearly four years and allowed oyster
beds to repopulate which attracted more oystermen. 210 Virginia’s hardships, however, only
intensified. In addition to the 32,751 Virginians who died in the war, the state debt increased to
approximately 41 million dollars and state revenue potentialities dropped by an estimated twothirds. Furthermore, the admittance of West Virginia into the Union as a state reduced Virginia’s
size and population by nearly a third which diminished the state’s taxable property. 211 The
abolition of slavery, additionally, eliminated a whole class of taxable “property” which
constituted approximately a third of the state’s total invested wealth during the antebellum
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period.212 The Civil War deepened Virginia’s economic hardships and state representatives were
hard pressed to find a solution. Recognizing that Virginia could no longer tax enslaved men and
women, the new Republican Governor, Francis Pierpont, recommended that the legislature
revive the oyster tax bill. Pierpont likely took inspiration from those who preceded him. Late in
the war, U.S. General Benjamin Butler earned the ire of the unionist Virginia state government
when he imposed military rule in eastern Virginia, restricted shipping, and taxed oystermen to
support the provost marshal’s fund during his occupation. 213 Pierpont voiced his complaints to
President Lincoln and Congress about Butler’s military occupation, but to no avail. Recognizing
the state’s horrific finances, however, Pierpont decided to follow Butler’s and Wise’s playbook.
In 1865, Pierpont referenced the failed Oyster Fundum Bill and claimed that the “privilege of
taking oysters is a legitimate subject of taxation.” 214 Once again, a Virginian governor argued it
was in the state’s best interest to intervene in the oyster industry and interstate commerce to
collect badly needed state revenue. In 1866 and The Virginia General Assembly passed the “Act
Imposing a Tax on Oysters.”215 Similar to Wise’s and Paxton’s Oyster Fundum Bill in all but
name, the tax charged ships transporting oysters out of the state three dollars for each ton of the
vessel’s tonnage.
Virginia’s decision to pass an oyster tonnage tax was controversial because it violated
Constitutional law. According to article 1, section 10, clause 3 of the Constitution, “No State
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shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage.”216 The new tax law charged
three dollars per ton on each oyster vessel transporting oysters out of Virginia. The Virginia state
government was effectively taxing and regulating interstate commerce which was under the strict
jurisdiction of the federal government. The Tonnage Clause is one of the least studied and
understood clauses of the Constitution that deals with federal power. 217 The Virginia oyster
tonnage tax was a challenge to the Constitution and some within the Virginian legislature was
aware of this fact. Many representatives debated its constitutionality during the state
Constitutional Convention in 1868.218 Although state representatives were more concerned with
state’s right to tax its property, the Virginia oyster tonnage tax was a state usurpation of powers
granted to the federal government by the Constitution.
In addition to the carrying trade, the state legislature also taxed Virginian oystermen and
especially targeted African Americans. Racial undertones influenced the creation of oyster tax
laws after the Civil War. With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, thousands of freedmen
and freedwomen moved to the Chesapeake Bay to live independently off the public commons.
Richard H. Edmonds remarked that black Virginians had “nearly monopolized” the state oyster
industry after the Civil War. 219 At the Virginia Constitutional Convention in 1868, one
representative from the oyster districts suggested that the only reason anyone supported oyster
taxes was to keep former slaves away from the rivers and make them pay for tools and boats. 220
If it was the legislature’s intent to restrict African Americans’ access to the oyster beds, they
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ultimately failed. By the time of Ingersoll’s report in 1881 African Americans consisted of the
majority of Virginian oystermen. During the antebellum period there were only a few hundred
white oystermen and after the war they numbered in the thousands. 221
Northern businesses were anxious to resume the Virginia oyster trade immediately after
the war. In some cases, the interference from the Civil War damaged the oyster industries in the
North. For example, the town Wellfleet, Massachusetts was highly engaged in the carrying trade.
In his travels Henry David Thoreau spoke to a Wellfleet oysterman before the war who remarked
that the oyster trade with the South was still “good and improving.” 222 The Virginia oyster trade
resumed in the postwar era, however, competition from new railroads and steamboats damaged
the schooner trade that thrived in the antebellum period.223 Other regions responded more
enthusiastically. Ship builders in New York City continued building schooners and sloops for the
Virginia oyster trade which aided businessmen to re-establish trade between the Empire State
and the Old Dominion. Shipbuilder David Carll built various ships for the oyster trade including
the H. W. Van Name, a 181-ton schooner named after a family of oyster dealers involved in the
Virginia oyster trade since the antebellum period. 224 New York newspapers such as the Brooklyn
Daily Eagle were also reporting news of fraud about New York oyster dealers attempting to pass
off planted Virginian oysters as Northern native blue points in the European trade. 225 These cases
of ship-building and fraud reveal that businessmen in Northern cities were anxious to resume the
oyster trade after the Civil War.
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Ship owners and masters were therefore shocked and indignant when they heard the news
of the new Virginian tax. After the Civil War Captain Samuel Freeman sailed into Nansemond
County to purchase oysters for shipment back to Maine. Like many other sailors involved in the
carrying business, he was surprised when the local Virginia oyster inspector John W. Ames
approached him and issued a hefty 303-dollar tax on his schooner, the H. Prescott. Perhaps after
pleading with the officer or shouting verbal abuse, Freeman likely informed Ames that such a tax
was unreasonable and equaled nearly the same cost as chartering the ship for this voyage. 226
Ames, however, gave no room for the negotiation and compelled Freeman pay one dollar for
every ton of his ship. Freeman stormed away and spent the next few days sailing back to Maine
contemplating how he was going to get paid and explain the situation to the ship’s owners with
the new Virginia tax law making the carrying trade nearly unprofitable. After he arrived back in
Maine, word of Virginia’s tax law quickly spread and eventually reached lawyer Rufus K.
Sewall. Seeing an opportunity for litigation, Sewall printed the pamphlet, “Oyster Tonnage Tax
on Commerce Illegal” telling the story of Captain Freeman’s run in with the Virginia oyster
tonnage tax. Sewall considered taking Virginia to court for violating the Constitution’s Tonnage
Clause and laid out the feasibility of prosecuting state officers such as John W. Ames who
enforced the tax.227 In the end, however, neither Freeman nor Sewall decided to take legal action.
Their reactions, however, show that oyster interests and legal professionals along the American
Northeast as far as Maine felt the pinch of the Virginia oyster tonnage tax.
Northern economic interests were not alone with their criticism of the new tax law.
Virginian oystermen and ship owners also sought to challenge the constitutionality of the oyster

226
227

“Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the Oyster Fundum,” 8.
Rufus King Sewall, “Oyster Tonnage Tax on Commerce Illegal,” Pamphlet (C.F. Barnes, 1866).

30

tonnage tax since they believed it threatened their livelihoods. In 1866, Virginian oystermen in
multiple counties petitioned the Norfolk County court not to enforce the oyster tax until the
courts established its constitutionality. They criticized the 1866 tax law and said, “we believe
that such laws are burdensome, and that the tax on tonnage is alike unconstitutional, unlawful
and well calculated to impair, if not utterly ruin, the oyster trade.” 228 Just like Senator Joseph
Christian predicted in 1860, Virginia’s oystermen opposed the oyster tax because it affected their
ability to participate in the oyster trade.
While Virginia remained under federal occupation, the military did not challenge the
oyster tonnage tax. Rather, they openly supported it. General John M. Schofield, the commander
of Virginia, redesignated District One after the Civil War, made modifications to the 1867 oyster
tax, but did not remove the tonnage tax because he believed it was necessary for Virginia to
sustain its credit.229 The U.S. military even supplied Virginia with federal troops to assist in tax
collection. In 1869, General Edward Canby sent a military detail of one officer and twenty
soldiers to assist a Virginian oyster inspector collect taxes from disobedient oystermen in the
Tangier Sound.230 Upon seeing the military’s support an oyster police inspector from Maryland
remarked:
These regulations are not only in accordance with the State statute, but they are
constantly enforced by the Military Commander of the District at the point of the
bayonet, which leads us to the conclusion that there is no difference of opinion
between the National and State Governments as to the constitutionality of those
measures.231

“Oystermen’s Meeting,” Norfolk Post (Norfolk, VA) Mar. 20, 1866.
“Oysters,” Daily Dispatch (Richmond, VA), Sept, 19, 1867; Norfolk Virginian as quoted in “The Oyster Tax,”
Daily Dispatch (Richmond, VA), Dec. 19, 1867.
230
“Virginia Items,” National Intelligencer (Washington D.C.), Oct. 12, 1869; Norfolk Virginian as quoted in “The
Oyster War – The Sinking of the Steamer Virginia,” Daily Dispatch (Richmond, VA), Oct. 27, 1869.
231
Hunter Davidson, Report Upon the Oyster Resources of Maryland to the General Assembly, 9-10.
228
229

31

Although they were likely unaware of what their action legally implied, the U.S. military
empowered the Virginia state government use unconstitutional mechanisms to enact a
protectionist economic policy and interfere with interstate commerce.
Ship owners and consumers from across the American Northeast petitioned Congress
seeking relief from Virginia oyster tonnage tax. Citizens and ship owners from New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts all signed and circulated petitions to
protest the Virginia oyster tonnage tax. 232 Even the wealthy wholesale oyster dealer and “Oyster
King” James Freeman from Maine, whose business was situated over 700 miles from Virginia,
petitioned Congress for the repeal of the oyster tonnage tax. 233 American consumers felt the
impact of the oyster tonnage tax up the entire length of the Atlantic coast. At first, it appeared
that the memorialists had succeeded when Republican Congressmen John Peter Cleaver Shanks
of Indiana proposed a joint resolution to terminate the Virginia oyster tonnage tax in 1869. The
resolution, however, fell on deaf ears and disappeared in the Congressional Committee on
Commerce never making it past a second reading. 234
Without the help of Congress or Northern entrepreneurs, Virginian oystermen and ship
owners took it upon themselves to remove the tonnage tax. In 1871 the Supreme Court of
Virginia heard two cases together in Johnson v. Drummond that addressed the constitutionality
of the oyster tonnage tax. The plaintiffs were vessel owners engaged in the Virginia oyster trade
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who refused to pay the tax and argued that it unconstitutional for its violation of the Tonnage
Clause. The court ruled in their favor and found the tonnage tax to be an unconstitutional state
tax on commerce rather than a tax on oysters.235 As a result of legal action, the Virginia
legislature repealed the oyster tonnage tax of 1866 and replaced it with a new tax law in 1871
with more careful language which charged ships for licenses and the amount of oysters taken
rather than just the ship’s tonnage.236
The failure of Congress to terminate the Virginia oyster tax is an odd exception to the
usual narrative of Congress’s role in reorganizing the national economy after the Civil War.
Scholars agree that the federal government under the control of the Republican party formed
alliances with capitalists and manufacturers in the Northeast and helped them extract natural
resources from the American South and West. 237 During the mid-to-late nineteenth century, the
federal government sought to suppress state and local attempts to control interstate commerce. 238
In 1869 the Macon Telegram of Georgia accused Congressman Shanks of taking money from
New York and New Jersey oystermen and claimed that “the Radicals are very particular to
enforce the Constitution to the interest of plunder.”239 In this instance, however, congressional
Republicans did not head businessmen’s calls to help integrate Virginia’s natural wealth in
oysters into the Northern-dominated economy. Instead, Congress allowed Virginian state law to
impede the flow of oysters into Northern markets. While this case study is not an absolute
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challenge to the narrative of the leviathan federal government, the Virginia oyster tonnage tax
reveals that there were some industries and natural resources that the Federal government did not
integrate into the emerging national economy. The Virginian oyster industry thus reveals the
unevenness of industrial consolidation of natural resources during Reconstruction. Despite the
complaints of capitalists and consumers throughout the greater Northeast, such as “Oyster King”
James Freeman of Maine, Congress remained ambivalent to the Virginian oyster question.
Perhaps this was due to governmental ignorance, lack of interest, or prioritization in more
important natural resources. In the end, the so-called American leviathan let the Virginian oyster
slip through its hands.
Policing the Line in the Sand
On August 29, 1875, oyster inspector Madison W. Hudson from Northumberland
County, Virginia, issued Robert Lewis a license to catch oysters in his small canoe. Hudson
filled out his report book in detail: the type of boat, the average amount of oysters sold and
caught per day, the river where the oysters were caught and the tax prescribed to it. 240 This
specific record keeping suggests that historian William Novak’s regulatory state was at work in
Virginia’s oyster industry during the later nineteenth century. Local laws created an army of
oyster inspectors and local officials who kept records, issued licenses, and collected taxes.
Novak’s analysis, however, does not significantly address how the regulatory state relied on
violence to protect local natural resources. The state government sought to prevent non-resident
oystermen, usually from Maryland, from illegally stealing oysters from Virginian waters in the
southern Chesapeake Bay. To accomplish this goal, the Virginia state government created an
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armed police force to patrol the coast, keep Maryland depredators out of state waters, and
enforce the oyster tax laws. Unlike the inspector’s report book, the Virginian oyster industry was
disorderly, violent, and in desperate need of state authority.
Going back to the antebellum period, state officials have struggled with regulating the
oyster industries. The Virginia state government had been regulating its oyster industry and
fighting against oyster pirates since the early 1800’s, however, its effectiveness was always a
question of dispute. Since the early republic, Virginia passed laws prohibiting its citizens from
certain activities such as using dredges to collect oysters or burning oyster shells to produce
lime.241 Most importantly, it was the responsibility of the local government to prevent nonresidents from stealing Virginian oysters. During the antebellum period, local authorities in
Virginia and Maryland struggled to stop outsiders from harvesting their oyster beds. Local
officials relied on forming a posse comitatus and chartering vessels to capture and chase off
depredators. In one instance in 1850, the Sheriff of Nansemond County, Virginia, accommodated
a steamship and an artillery company, captured 10 vessels, and arrested 75 men. 242
Back during the debate on the Oyster Fundum Bill in the 1850s, Governor Henry Wise
and Senator James Paxton argued that the creation of a state police force of armed steamships
would better enforce the oyster laws of the state and keep non-residents from raiding Virginian
oyster beds. Paxton argued that past legislation was ineffective because “violators of the law
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were afloat, and the officers ashore, that the latter had no means of detecting offenders, and when
detected, no efficient means for their arrest.” Seeing that past enforcement was ineffective,
Paxton believed it was necessary to rely on the force of cannons.243 After Joseph Christian’s
protest that the bill would grant excessive police power to an armed navy and threaten citizens’
civil liberty, the issue of the oyster navy disappeared.244 After the Civil War, however, Virginia
desperately needed a police force to protect its oyster beds from the encroachment of nonresidents. One Northern newspaper predicted that “unless the State of Virginia does something to
prohibit people living outside of that State from gathering oysters, the business the coming
season will be large, and the prices materially cheapened.” 245 To prevent this from happening,
the Virginia legislature then created its first oyster navy in 1867. Maryland would quickly follow
its example the following year.

“Oyster Fundum: Speech of Mr. Paxton of Rockbridge, [concluded],” Richmond Enquirer (Richmond, VA), Jun.
8, 1858.
244 Speech of Joseph Christian on the “Oyster Fundum” Bill, 4,13, 19-20.
245
“The Oyster Trade,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle (Brooklyn, NY) Sept. 9, 1865.
243

36

Figure 3: A Steamboat from the Virginia oyster police examines a carrying ship246

The effectiveness of the Virginian oyster police, commonly called the oyster navy,
remained limited in the face of its Herculean task. For one, the responsibility of patrolling the
state’s waters fell to only three small armed steam tugboats and a collection of inspectors
scattered along the coast. Even with this force, the state’s ability to effectively regulate and
monitor the southern Chesapeake Bay remained limited. As historian Christopher Pastore,
observed, historically it is challenging for societies to impose order and control over the coast,
which is the conjunction between ordered land and the ungovernable sea. 247 In other words, it is
exceptionally difficult for state officials to project their authority over a marine environment. The
Virginia oyster navy faced the daunting task of having to patrol the disputed maritime border in
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the Chesapeake Bay where valuable oyster beds attracted oystermen from Virginia, Maryland,
and neighboring states. After the Civil War, the chief inspectors of the Virginia and Maryland
oyster navies formed the Davidson-Lovett Line, an informal agreement that failed to prevent
oyster boats from working on the other state’s oyster beds.248 The state legislatures in Maryland
and Virginia failed come to any agreement, leaving the oyster navies scrambling to contain the
damage.

Figures 4 and 5: An Oyster Pirate Being Chased by a Police Boat in the Chesapeake Bay. Oyster Police
Officers Looking for Pirates249

The Virginia oyster navy attempted to protect its oyster beds from Marylanders through
the use of violent force. Although small, the steamships in the oyster navy were armed
representatives of the state. The steamships often patrolled the disputed regions in the Tangier
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Sound and Potomac Sound arresting Maryland oystermen for allegedly stealing Virginian
oysters. In one incident in 1868, the Virginian oyster navy got into a gunfight with oystermen in
the Tangier Sound causing the death of one oyster inspector.250 The legislature sold the boats in
the first Virginian oyster navy in 1874 when it became clear that the revenue from the oyster tax
was lower than anticipated and the maintenance costs for the steamships could not be justified.
Animosities between the oyster navy and oyster pirates in Virginia and Maryland
amplified in the 1880s and 1890s. 251 After Virginia disbanded its first oyster police force, the
state failed to effectively collect any revenue and by 1879 the oyster beds were almost
completely depleted. In the early 1880s Virginian Readjuster Governor Cameron advocated for a
new second oyster police force to enforce state laws. Building a larger steamship, the
Chesapeake, the Virginian oyster navy returned and used force to arrest and chase oyster pirates
out of state waters. Gun fights were not frequent, but it was not uncommon for the oyster navy to
use force or for oystermen to die while attempting a daunting escape. Before, the oyster navies
used their guns in self-defense or to scare the violators back across the state line, but in the
1890s, they started shooting to hit and kill. 252 In 1894, Maryland oystermen on Smiths Island
started a gunfight with a Virginia police boat which fired back with its cannons. 253 After
witnessing a battle between some forty small oyster boats in 1895, one journalist asserted, “this
is the only occasion since the close of the civil war upon which a cannon has been fired, with
hostile intent, in territory belonging to the United States.” 254 While the reporter’s comment was
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perhaps an exaggeration within America’s larger military history, it emphasizes that the
protection of the oyster industries in Virginia and Maryland was at times a matter of life and
death. In their attempt to raise revenue from its oysters, Virginia relied on state-sanctioned force
to protect its resources from non-residents.
Northern Capital in Virginian Oyster Beds
Although the state government was in desperate need of revenue and wealth, the Virginia
legislature continued to reject Northern capital from aiding its oyster industry after the Civil
War. Some individual capitalists from the North such as James Sands Darling brought their
wealth with them to Virginia by becoming a resident. After obtaining special permission from
the Virginia state legislature, Darling planted some 30,000 dollars-worth of oysters off the coast
of Hampton, purchased his own vessels, and employed over 5,000 men in his oyster packing
business.255 Because Darling moved to Virginia after the war, he received special permission to
invest his capital in his private oyster beds and develop the oyster industry. Before the war there
was only one oyster firm in Norfolk, but with the help of capital from Boston and New York, and
individuals such as James S. Darling, that number increased to fifteen by 1880.256 Darling’s
story, however, is an exceptional case. After the Civil War, Virginian law continued its
protectionist policies and prohibited Northern capitalists from investing their capital into
Virginia’s oyster beds unless they moved South.
Virginian law prohibited non-residents from placing their capital in Virginian oyster beds
unless they engaged through approved channels in the Southern oyster trade, or if they relocated
to Virginia. In 1876 the Supreme Court of the United States heard a case concerning James W.
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McCready, an oyster trader from Maryland, who was fined five hundred dollars for illegally
planting oysters in Virginian waters as a non-resident. McCready claimed that Virginia’s laws
violated the U.S. Constitution for denying the citizens from other states the privileges and
immunities of Virginians and for interfering with Congress’s ability to regulate interstate
commerce. The court, however, ruled in support of Virginia’s claim to regulate tidewater oyster
beds and give state residents the exclusive right to use them.257 The McCready v. State of
Virginia (1876) ruling re-affirmed Virginia’s protectionist economic policies to prevent nonresidents from profiting from Virginian oyster beds outside of legal channels of trade.
Various Virginians complained about the state government restricting “foreign capital”
from the oyster industry. One reader of the Richmond Dispatch commented that it was unfair to
permit “foreign capitalists to invest their capital in lands, merchandise, railroads, and other
property and business within her limits” while also “consistently prohibit the use and
employment of such capital in the oyster business.” 258 Virginians often protested that this
restriction was detrimental to the state’s industry. In an ironic inversion of the antebellum
debates, advocates for Northern capital used Northern exploitation as a justification for opening
new lines of credit. “Reason” from the Richmond Dispatch wrote that the laws prohibiting
foreign capital inhibited the state’s wealth and prosperity and made Virginian tongmen “’hewers
of wood’ for the northern planter.” Using similar language to Paxton back in the antebellum
period, “Reason” argued that repealing this law would encourage planting and packing houses
and open a home market to benefit oystermen. He argued against the “suicidal policy” that
limited foreign capital from Virginia’s oyster industry.
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What would be thought of a law which forbade the non-resident capitalist from
investing his money in a Virginian manufactory?... No matter how desirous the
enterprising citizen of New York may be to invest his money in oyster-planting in
Virginia the law says” ‘No. Keep your money In New York waters. You can’t
bring it down here to our oysters, but we will allow out oysters to be carried to
New York to your money.259
Advocates for Northern capital argued that removing restrictions would enrich the state,
the Northern capitalist and Virginian oysterman alike. The Virginian legislature,
however, was not convinced and the restriction remained.
Many influential Virginians and Northern advocates favored opening Virginia’s oyster
beds to foreign capital. After completing his survey of the oyster grounds in Virginia in 1893,
James B. Baylor, recommended that the state promote oyster culture by renting out baren regions
along the coast and repealing the restriction on foreign capital. In order for Virginia to implement
the artificial oyster cultivation practiced in the Northern states, Baylor argued that oyster planting
and deep-water oyster cultivation required large amounts of capital for rent and labor-saving
appliances. He said “If she [Virginia] is to derive a direct revenue from the rental of this barren
area, she must let in capital from sister States for its cultivation.” 260 Baylor later argued against
state restrictions on foreign capital again in 1894 when various men involved in the oyster
industry attended a convention to share their visions for the oyster industry with the Richmond
Chamber of Commerce. Virginian Governors Philip W. McKinney and Charles O’Farrell wanted
to improve the industry so that the state could generate a larger oyster tax revenue since past
laws were inefficient and rarely generated any profit. Baylor again advocated for allowing
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outside capital and selling barren oyster grounds to generate a heftier revenue. 261 Northern oyster
monopolists such as Henry C. Rowe of New Haven also traveled to Richmond to share his
thoughts on Virginia’s oyster legislation. Rowe spoke of his role in developing deep-water oyster
culture in Connecticut and the Long Island Sound, his purchase of 15,000 acres of submarine
land, the hundreds of thousands of dollars he spent on experiments and labor, and how his
enemies back in Connecticut called him a “damned capitalist.” 262 Rowe was the living example
of what Virginian oystermen could accomplish by permitting large amounts of capital to be
invested in oyster grounds. Despite their best efforts, the Richmond Chamber of Commerce and
the Virginia legislature, however, remained unconvinced and the state continued to prohibit nonresidents and their capital from touching the Virginian coast.
While surveyors, capitalists, and newspaper writers supported opening Virginian oyster
beds to Northern capital, many Virginian oystermen also opposed it. Oystermen expressed their
views during the Hampton Oyster Convention, one of the first large conventions that debated the
state of the industry held in Norfolk in 1885. Black and white representatives of Virginian
oystermen committed themselves to their predecessors’ belief that the industry should support
the local oysterman rather than the Northern capitalist. They argued that oyster beds were held in
common for public use and that the state government did not possess the right to lease them out
to anyone. They feared that such power would eventually encourage the state to allow
“mammoth corporations” to enclose Virginia’s oyster beds. Rather that permit Northern capital
from entering their waters, the oystermen wanted to state government to return to the moral
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economy of the antebellum period when the state only held the oyster beds in trust for the
oystermen.263 Just as in the antebellum period, oystermen rejected the state government’s
authority to lease the coast off to wealthy capitalists and monopolists.
Virginia maintained its ban on foreign capital through the end of the century and
remained especially hostile to out-of-state corporations. In 1903 the new Virginia Corporation
Commission refused to grant a chapter to an out of state corporation for oysters. This was the
first the commission had rejected a corporation charter since it started a year ago. The
commission rejected the charter because there were multiple applicants and signers from
Maryland which violated the prohibition on non-residents engaging in the Virginian oyster
industry. While the Commission acknowledged that corporations could transfer stock from
residents to non-residents, they could not issue the charter without violating state law. 264 The
Virginia state legislature finally repealed the ban on foreign capital in 1916, under the condition
that such corporations be chartered in Virginia. 265 Upon repeal of the old law, capitalists from
around the country celebrated. One capitalist who owned oyster beds throughout the Northeast
wrote to the Virginia Commission of Fisheries, “I believe that the idea that other States of the
Union are not foreign countries, but are part of our whole nation is steadily increasing.” 266 After
over half a decade, oystermen’s worst fears were realized as Northern corporations and planters
had access to their oyster beds. After decades of failure, Virginian statesmen finally threw in the
towel and opened the state’s eastern mines of wealth to the North.
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Conclusion
As it became clear towards the turn of the nineteenth century that Virginia’s attempt to
control the coast had failed, the industry adopted a more progressive approach. Rather than pass
legislation to influence an extracted resource, Virginians turned towards privatization,
rationalization, and modern science to promote oyster cultivation. However, historians should
recognize that the history the Virginian oyster industry is also the story about an attempt to
escape regional economic dependency and a violent battle over regulating a coastal industry full
of people who were as unruly as the waters they worked on. Virginian policymakers attempted to
regulate a resource that they did not have ability to control. When they attempted to assert some
sense of control over the oyster beds of the Chesapeake Bay, it resulted in violence, confusion,
and conflict with the law. Moving forward reformers would develop a new form of oyster
cultivation that reconciled these chaotic, ineffective, and contradictory methods with the
promises of rationalization, scientific cultivation, efficiency. 267
However, as this narrative has shown, the Virginian oyster industry was not simply an
instance of chaos. While certainly chaotic, violent, and perhaps ineffective, Virginia’s oyster
industry demonstrates consistencies over the course of the nineteenth century when viewed
through the lens of interstate commerce, economic protectionism, and fears of exploitation. From
Governor Wise’s messages in the 1850s to the repeal of the ban on foreign capital in 1916,
Virginia struggled to support its oyster industry and establish itself alongside the entrepreneurs,
capitalists, and markets in the North. By analyzing the oyster commodity, this essay has analyzed
several key economic and political developments in Virginia’s history. Wise believed his desire
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for the Southern commercial revolution depended on his ability to protect Virginian oysters from
Northern exploitation. Virginia’s protectionist policy carried over into the postbellum period
when it implemented the illegal tonnage tax and challenged federal authority. The Virginian
legislature created a police force to prevent non-residents from crossing an ill-defined marine
border to take its resources. Finally, the Virginia state government prohibited non-resident oyster
planters from investing in oyster cultivation. For most of the second half of the nineteenth
century, Virginia implemented protectionist economic policies with its oyster industries,
however, it is difficult to argue that these policies were a success. The state legislature repealed
the oyster tonnage tax in 1871. For most of their existence, the oyster police struggled to prevent
foreign depredators from harvesting oysters or justify its existence. Virginia’s oyster beds were
constantly on the verge of depletion. The prohibitions on Northern capital further stagnated the
development of the oyster industry. In its own efforts to protect its domestic industry and
generate a large state revenue to find modernization, Virginian policymakers only hampered
their own progress. Governor Wise predicted that the oyster beds would be the eastern mine of
wealth, but it never lived up to his expectations. It was only at the end of the nineteenth century
that Richard H. Edmonds realized the ugly truth. He claimed in his report:
Many who have never lived near the water, and who gain their information from
the rose-colored pictures, drawn by correspondents who see only the best features
of the trade, imagine that an oyster bed is a mine of wealth, from which every
oysterman may gather a liberal competence with but little labor. Nothing could be
more erroneous.268
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